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Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans



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outhern Africa: Proposals for Americans



A Report of a National Policy Panel established by the
United Nations Association of the United States of America



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UNA-USA


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
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Preface

CYRUS R. VANCE, *Chairman*
UNA-USA Policy Studies Committee



This report deals with a group of Southern African issues which, in one form or another, have been the concern of the international community, and of the United Nations, for over two decades. The problems have been intractable and little progress has been made in resolving them.

The UNA Policy Studies Committee believed a new appraisal was needed — of the Southern African issues themselves; of the balance of U.S. interests on the African continent; and of what the U.S. government and U.S. citizens could do to facilitate peaceful change in the southern third of Africa.

The establishment of a National Policy Panel for a fresh examination of these questions — matters of fundamental importance to white and black alike and involving the destiny of a continent — could have been considered presumptuous. It was clearly an act of faith.

This is a time when the United States is painfully re-examining intervention in foreign situations. The national mood is more one of restricting and scrutinizing foreign involvements rather than extending them. There was thus the question of whether any recommendations for a more active U.S. policy would in fact fit with this new sense of national priority.

But the re-examination of our national priorities has, if anything, added, I believe, to the importance of the work of the Panel. Issues of human rights, of economic opportunity, and of relations between the races, have staked out new claims to our attention and our convictions. We are finding that these questions pay little heed to national boundaries. They are international in scope. Thus the issues


in Southern Africa — of social discrimination and oppression, and of self-determination — are ones which are likely to engage increasingly, not only the other countries of Africa, but American citizens as well.

William Roth and his colleagues have examined this set of issues with perception and have come forward with recommendations for U.S. government and U.S. corporate policy. I believe the recommendations deserve careful and serious consideration.

The report emphasizes the extent to which change in the southern third of Africa must come from within, through the work of indigenous forces — white and non-white alike. But it also points to those things that the U.S. government and U.S. citizens can do, consistent with our obligations and our special opportunities.

UNA-USA is profoundly grateful to William Roth and William Coleman for their able and perceptive leadership of the Panel; to the other Panel members who, each from their own vantage point, contributed so greatly to the work of the group; and to Brenda Mahoney, whose thorough and effective work as Project Director helped make possible this significant report.

Under established policy, the responsibility for UNA Policy Panel reports is taken by the members of each Panel. UNA-USA takes responsibility for choosing the subject, for selecting the Panel members, and for publishing their report.



1. Introduction

At a time when domestic issues cry out for attention and resources, and when the United States is still preoccupied with extricating itself from a painful, divisive, and costly involvement in Indo-China, there is a tendency to relegate African issues to a low priority on the agenda of national and international concerns. Indeed, there is a tendency to feel that African issues can wait while we deal with more critical and immediate problems.

Yet the African continent is the scene of two great dramas whose outcome has major implications for U.S. foreign policy, for the American people, and for the United Nations. In independent Africa the struggle for the growth of viable political, economic, and social institutions is being waged against formidable odds. And in southern Africa a struggle for basic human rights is unfolding that has within it the seeds of potentially serious conflict.

The interaction of these dramas — the instabilities they give rise to in Africa and the strains they impose on the United Nations — raises probing questions for American foreign policy.

In his Report to The Congress on foreign affairs in February 1971, President Nixon expressed U.S. policy toward southern Africa in the following terms:

“... racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my administration, and to me personally. We cannot be indifferent to apartheid. Nor can we ignore the tensions created in Africa by the denial of political self-determination. We shall do what we can to foster equal opportunity and free political expression instead. We shall do so on both moral and practical grounds, for in our view there is no other solution.”

For many years, and in virtual unanimity, the international community has called for racial equality and self-determination in southern Africa. There is little disagreement outside that region that the present system of white minority governments — in South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique — should not and will not endure. Disagreement exists largely over **how** and **when** basic human rights will be achieved and under what conditions.

The Panel began its work in full agreement on the necessity and inevitability of profound change. As work progressed, we became increasingly aware of the pervasiveness and depth of the oppressive conditions which exist in southern Africa — of their roots in racial and historical factors and in mutual fears. We noted differences in the policies of the several white regimes — e.g., South Africa's apartheid and "separate development" vs. Portugal's limited grant of political rights and social status. But we found the official rationale in each case woefully unresponsive to actual human needs.

Africa is a massive continent three and a quarter times the size of the United States, with a population of 362 million encompassing 42 states. It provides important mineral resources for the U.S. including gold, copper, bauxite, high grade iron ore, and many other minerals for which the continent is the major source. American investments in Africa total over \$3 billion and our imports and exports over \$1 billion each. African States represent one-third the voting power of the UN General Assembly. One out of every ten Americans has historical roots in Africa.

Decolonization of Asia and Africa, with the United Nations playing a large role, has been one of the great historical movements of the past generation. It marks a newly achieved international norm, in light of which white minority rule in southern Africa is seen as a gross anachronism to the Afro-Asian majority, indeed to nearly all UN members. Appeals and demands for redress of these inequities are certain to continue, until there is redress. Moreover, there appears to be a growing sympathetic tie between black Americans — a racial minority which too has known

slavery, discrimination, and loss of cultural identity — and the repressed non-white¹ majorities in southern Africa, a phenomenon which has been referred to as “black America’s increasing transnational identification with the black world.”

In the eloquent Lusaka Manifesto drawn up in 1969, leaders of 13 independent African nations acknowledged that the struggle for human dignity in their own states was “only beginning.” They condemned the white regimes of southern Africa not because racial equality and self-determination have not already been achieved, but because the regimes reject or oppose the very principles themselves.

The Manifesto takes account of the fears of the whites, especially those for whom southern Africa is, legitimately, the same homeland as it is for the blacks. This is especially true for the whites of South Africa, whose forebears settled at Cape Town in 1652, much more than for the other parts of southern Africa where settlement of any numbers is of more recent origin; but even for these the Manifesto displays restraint. “Our stand towards southern Africa,” these 13 African States declared, “involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination.”

“... We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.”

¹For purposes of this report, we have tended to use the broader term, non-white, to include blacks, coloreds, Indians, etc. The term “African” could technically apply to both white and non-white.

While the Manifesto is no guarantee that the ideals expressed will actually be realized, it does stand as a reminder that neighboring African states are not blind to the whites' situation, and would prefer conciliation to violence.

Meanwhile, however, the accumulated tensions are severe and the invitations to violence many. Guerilla incursions are, and have been for several years, a fact of life in Angola and Mozambique, and more episodically in Rhodesia and South West Africa. In South Africa the use of such extreme measures as the Terrorism Act no less constitutes a resort to violence.

The weight of wrongs visited on non-whites in southern Africa does not allow the African states to be neutral. Some may still be willing to try conciliation, but only in pursuit of radical change. Ill-equipped to challenge the white regimes militarily, they will continue to support the liberation movements. These are committed to violence and though they appear to have little immediate prospect of generating a successful insurgency, they may further undermine the area's stability or provoke incidents with serious repercussions.

In this unhappy dilemma the African states still look to the democratic governments of the West for assistance, through the UN and outside it. They have won substantial support, including that of the U.S. government, but the intransigence of the white minority regimes insures that stronger measures will be urged upon us.

Where will the Africans turn if Western support is not forthcoming? Is there a danger that Africa may become a new battlefield for old cold war issues? How will the UN be affected? What are U.S. policy interests in southern Africa?

This study examines the basic problems of southern Africa, and makes recommendations bearing on American policy in light of basic human rights and of U.S. domestic and international interests. Sections 2 and 3 set out in some detail present U.S. interests and involvement throughout southern Africa and the relation of these interests to other U.S. policy considerations. In the last Section we have examined each of the five major areas of southern Africa individually setting forth some basic background and analysis, and making

policy recommendations thereon.


In making its recommendations the Panel has attempted to weigh the opinions of the progressive leadership — both non-white and white — within the countries themselves. But the absence of free political expression for non-whites makes it presumptuous for outsiders — Americans, Europeans, even Africans — to speak with flat assurance concerning the policies and programs that ought to be undertaken. Do most non-whites in South Africa want an international boycott or the withdrawal of foreign investments? How do Namibia's Africans regard the proposal for a supervised plebiscite? It is difficult for other nations to shape their own policies toward these areas without answers to some of these still unanswered basic questions.

The Panel's recommendations are no "solution" to the oppressive situation which exists in southern Africa. The problems of southern Africa are of a magnitude and complexity precluding simplistic talk of solutions. Even "change" must be treated carefully: change is inevitable but is likely to occur in a series of developments, on different timetables in the different political entities.

Our recommendations are an attempt to bring U.S. policy into clearer alignment with our nation's stated objectives of racial equality and self-determination and to make the most of such opportunities for non-violent change as may still exist in southern Africa.



2. Africa and Southern Africa: An Analysis of U.S. Interests



A. Political and Human Rights

Southern Africa is a massive area of the world where the majority of the people are denied participation in the governments which govern them solely on the basis of the color of their skin. It is an area where participation in the government by the majority of the people who were born and live there neither exists nor is an accepted goal.

The crucial facts are that in South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), Rhodesia, and the Portuguese Territories of Angola and Mozambique, 35 million non-whites are living under governments controlled by 4 million whites — governments which by their laws and policies deny non-whites effective representation or participation.

The conditions and political framework for the denial of basic human rights to non-whites in southern Africa vary as, for example, between South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. Nevertheless, throughout vast areas, white minority or colonial-type governments continue to dictate the terms under which the non-white majorities are permitted to live. This denial of basic human freedoms to blacks is often rationalized in terms of “uplifting” the “backward” or “uncivilized” non-white native populations, but the real issue is the determination of man to have a voice in the affairs of his own government — to select his own leaders and to help formulate the laws which govern him. This is what the non-whites of southern Africa are struggling for and will continue to struggle for until they have achieved it.

In Mozambique, whites represent 1 percent of the population; in Angola, 4 percent; in Southern Rhodesia, 4.6 percent; in Namibia, 14 percent; and in South Africa, 19 percent. These percentages are,

in fact, growing even smaller as the non-white population increases. In South Africa, for example, the black population increased over the last ten years alone by a figure greater than the entire white population.

In their struggle to govern themselves and to obtain their basic human rights, the non-white populations of southern Africa will continue to seek international assistance. For the overwhelming predominance of military, economic, and political power lies with the whites. Indigenous black groups are already seeking support in various ways — from textbooks and guns to arousing international concern and protest. It is not likely to be of critical concern to them whether this assistance comes from the Western or Communist nations.

B. Economic

The continent of Africa is neither a major investment nor a major trading area for the United States, although it is important in some markets, for particular American companies, and as a chief source of certain raw materials. Greatest U.S. economic interest in southern Africa is in the Republic of South Africa. This interest, though significant, is not essential when viewed in relation to overall U.S. international economic activity.

Investment

Total private U.S. investment in South Africa amounted to about \$750 million in 1970 — approximately one percent of U.S. direct private foreign investments and about 25 percent of total U.S. investments on the African continent. Nearly 300 American firms are represented in South Africa.² In 1969 the rate of return on direct investments was 18.2 percent — in comparison with an average of 12.2 percent worldwide and 5.3 percent in the rest of Africa, excluding Libya.

About 50 percent of U.S. investment in South Africa is in manufacturing — automobile manufacture and assembly, drugs, cosmetics, industrial machinery and equipment, tire and rubber manufacture, and tractor and farm equipment manufacture and distribution. Oth-

²Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Trade List, South Africa, September 1970.

er substantial U.S. investments are in petroleum, mining, and smelting. These represent about 15 percent of total **foreign** investments in South Africa.

In view of the overall vitality of South Africa's economy it would be difficult to term American investments as essential to South Africa's continued growth. American investments do not hold a pivotal position in this respect.

Gulf Oil's \$150 million project in Cabinda (Angola) accounts for the lion's share of U.S. investments in Angola. Our investments in Mozambique amount to between \$5 and \$10 million. About twenty U.S. companies operate in these areas, concentrating in mineral prospecting and oil exploration and production.

U.S. investments in Namibia total about \$50 million — primarily in the Tsumeb mining company, although a dozen or more firms have small interests there.

By contrast, direct private U.S. investments in the rest of Africa account for over \$2 billion — more than twice that of U.S. investments in white-ruled southern Africa. Libyan investments, largely in petroleum, account for about \$775 million of this figure.

Approximately forty American firms were operating in Southern Rhodesia prior to the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. After the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory UN sanctions against Rhodesia, many of these firms were "mandated" or "sequestered" by the Rhodesian Government, which presently exercises supervision and control. The future status of these firms is unclear.

Trade

U.S. exports to South Africa including Namibia represented \$563 million in 1970 in relation to total U.S. exports of \$43 billion. Imports were \$288 million in relation to a total of \$40 billion. The significance of U.S. trade with South Africa would appear to be more in terms of a U.S. trade surplus, which in 1970 amounted to \$275 million. When the U.S. balance of payments is in heavy deficit and particularly when we are in a balance of trade deficit, as occurred in 1971 — the first time since 1893 — it could be argued that this is an

important figure.

In relation to the overwhelming size and diversity of the U.S. economy, however, it is obvious that U.S./South African trade is, in the aggregate, of marginal significance. Nor does a study of the list of imports and exports indicate that specific sectors of our economy would be severely affected if such trade were not available, although there is always the possibility of a specialized case where the impact could be severe.

U.S. trade is much more important to South Africa. It represents about 17 percent of her imports and 13 percent of her exports (excluding gold). The South African economy is increasingly dependent on a burgeoning manufacturing sector and most U.S. exports go to that sector. However, these products would be obtainable from other industrialized countries, were American sources closed to her.

U.S. exports to Angola in 1970 amounted to approximately \$38 million (10 percent of her total imports), and U.S. imports from Angola amounted to \$68 million (17 percent of her total exports), mostly in coffee. Trade with Mozambique in 1970 amounted to approximately \$22 million in exports (9 percent of her total imports) and \$18 million in imports (10 percent of Mozambique's total exports), mostly in cashew nuts.

While these figures represent a minute fraction of total U.S. trade, they represent a substantial percentage for Angola and Mozambique.

Since 1968 when sanctions were imposed by the Security Council, the U.S. has had no trade with Southern Rhodesia, with certain minor exceptions provided for by the Council. This matter is presently under consideration in Congress and is discussed further in the section on Southern Rhodesia.

In the rest of Africa — outside white-ruled southern Africa — U.S. exports amounted to about 950 million and imports about 735 million in 1970.

Direct U.S. Government economic participation in South Africa is limited to the Export-Import Bank. And even here the Bank's activities have been circumscribed in recent years to participation in short

and medium-term guarantees and insurance to U.S. banks for loans on U.S. exports to South Africa.

As of June 1971 the Bank's total exposure in South Africa in terms of guarantees and insurance amounted to \$33.8 million. This is represented by regular bank and export guarantees and short and medium-term insurance to U.S. private lenders against business and political risks (expropriation, exchange control, etc.) for U.S. exports. It has become Bank policy not to extend loans — no direct loans have been extended to South Africa during the last seven years.

The U.S. and British Economic Stake in South Africa

In formulating its policies toward South Africa the U.S. has traditionally been concerned with the economic effects these policies might have on Great Britain. This concern has been largely motivated by fear of the effect on the dollar of a weakened position for the pound sterling — the world's second most important reserve currency.

In 1970 Britain's exports to South Africa totalled \$800 million and her imports \$620 million; her total investments in South Africa amount to about \$3.5 billion. These figures represent about 4% of Britain's exports, 3% of her imports, and 10% of her total foreign investments. It is interesting to note that while Britain's economic stake in South Africa is substantial, South Africa's stake in Britain is greater.

Great Britain accounts for about a third of South Africa's exports, about one fourth of her imports, and over 60 percent of her foreign investments. South Africa is a member of the Commonwealth Preference Area, although she left the Commonwealth in 1961. These preferences and exemption from exchange control play an important part in South Africa's prosperity. Loss of preferences now that Britain has decided to join the Common Market will probably mean a significant decrease in British trade with the Republic and is likely to adversely affect South Africa's overall economic position.

The U.S. and South African Gold

South Africa produces 75 percent of the Western world's supply of newly mined gold, and the U.S. has traditionally had an important

stake in its free flow into the international system, mainly because of the role of the dollar as the world's major reserve and trading currency. However, several recent developments have diminished the importance of South African gold to the monetary system — including the establishment of the two-tier gold market and the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's), the new international reserve asset. The SDR's provide a means for increasing the international liquidity needed to finance expanding trade and payments, and as they grow, will probably assume a larger proportionate share in the world total reserves. But because these arrangements are new and not yet seriously tested, confidence in them has not yet been fully established. Although the U.S. has not been particularly gold conscious — or as Secretary of the Treasury Connally has said, "The U.S. is not hung-up on gold" — it is still considered the supreme monetary asset in many parts of the world, especially in Europe.

Developments in the late summer and early fall of 1971 leave open the possibility of further alterations in the international monetary system. The trend is away from reestablishing the preeminence of gold. Gold is still important, but it is less important now than ever before.

C. Military and Strategic

Africa south of the Sahara has never been of critical military importance to the U.S. Even in terms of military support facilities Africa's importance has greatly diminished. An extensive complex of North African air and naval base facilities was built up in the 1950s and 1960s, when planes and ships were of more limited range than is now the case. But these were almost entirely phased out by 1969. Technology brought ICBMs, Polaris-based missiles, and long-range B-52 bombers that can refuel in mid-air. The surface navy too has been able to lessen substantially its dependence on African port facilities.

Of perhaps greater importance to the U.S. is the maintenance of a technologically sophisticated military communications center such as that in Ethiopian Eritrea.

In southern Africa the Simonstown naval base near Cape Town, South Africa, is the most extensive and modern military support facility in that part of the world. There are varying opinions concerning the importance of this base to the United States, especially since the closing of the Suez Canal. In fact, however, it would be difficult to argue that use of this base is "essential" or "vital." The U.S. has carried on a strenuous war effort in Vietnam for several years now, using the sea lanes off the coast of the Republic, but not since 1967 has any U.S. naval vessel made a port call in the Republic, except for emergencies. The 1955 agreement by which Britain transferred the Simonstown base to South Africa stipulates that its facilities will be available to Britain and Britain's allies in time of war whether or not South Africa is itself engaged. The argument used extensively by the South African Government and Britain's Conservative Government that Simonstown will become critical in dealing with a possible Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean does not appear to have had much impact on U.S. policy-makers or policy.

Modern technology has imposed a new set of military and strategic considerations which are quickly outdated those of the 1950s and 1960s. In the coming decade greatest military and strategic U.S. concern on the continent of Africa may be a negative one, that is, concern over the possible granting of use of African bases and facilities to the Soviets — and perhaps the Chinese. Many of those who oppose Britain's renewed arms sale to South Africa fear that black-ruled African states, such as Tanzania, might retaliate for what they consider to be an act of Western support for the "racist regime of South Africa" by granting naval and/or air facilities in their territories to Communist forces.

The Azores

The U.S.-Portuguese accord for U.S. military bases in the Azores — Portuguese islands off the northwest coast of Africa — ran out in 1962. Since that time the U.S. has been operating there "by courtesy of the Portuguese Government." It is sometimes argued that if the U.S. were to take action against Portugal on behalf of her Afri-

can "territories," Portugal might retaliate by denying the U.S. further use of the islands. Recent technical developments, however, are affecting their strategic importance. Combat aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels now cross the Atlantic with less reliance on support facilities such as the Azores. Support of ground troops in Europe in times of crisis has been facilitated by prepositioning of supplies and equipment on the Continent. And with more and more long-range transport aircraft, less and less emphasis is being placed on the actual or contingent role of the Azores.


The islands do retain an importance in regard to the support they could provide in antisubmarine warfare. Yet technological developments combined with political considerations are forcing a channeling of U.S. policy away from the establishment and maintenance of foreign bases to greater reliance on bases on U.S. soil. And it appears that in the case of the Azores, scientific and political developments combine to render this base both technologically dispensable and politically costly.

Facilities in Africa Related to Space Programs

NASA has a satellite station and a deep space network station near Johannesburg, South Africa as well as an optical camera tracking station in Olifantsfontein, South Africa. However, in relation to the twelve additional stations with similar 85 foot antennae in other parts of the world and the recent cutbacks in the space program, the Johannesburg deep space station appears to be marginal.

NASA networks are sometimes used for tracking of unclassified scientific Department of Defense satellites. In addition, the Department of Defense has a limited system of fixed ground stations serving its space satellite programs which include two near Pretoria: the Air Force's Eastern Test Range station and a station in the Navy's Transnavigational satellite network. Additional information on the Defense Department's space program facilities in South Africa is not available.

3. The Relation and Importance of Southern African Issues to U.S. Policy



A. In the United Nations

Most African States are determined to bring about the end of apartheid and minority rule in southern Africa and are using the United Nations as one of the chief instruments for achieving this. African States now comprise 42 of the 131 member UN General Assembly.

With this voting power and the growing awareness and concern of the international community, African states have been able to bring southern African issues to the top of the General Assembly's agenda. Subsequent discussion in the various UN bodies and votes on innumerable resolutions have forced UN member states, including the U.S., to formulate and publicly state their positions on the entire range of this complex and emotional set of issues.

The major problem for African states has been that while by sheer numbers they have been able to command the adoption of resolutions calling for strong action (the General Assembly has majority recommendatory powers), they have not had the means to implement them. Frustrated by the lack of concrete, forceful action against the minority governments, Africans at the UN have more recently begun to turn the focus of their attention on "economic interests" in the area — especially those of the U.S. and U.K. as the "main trading partners of South Africa." At the 25th (1970) session of the General Assembly a resolution was adopted urging all States:

- "(a) To terminate diplomatic, consular and other official relations with the South African Government;

- (b) To terminate all military, economic, technical and other co-operation with South Africa;
- (c) To end tariff and other preferences to South African exports and facilities for investment in South Africa ..."

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 91 in favor, 16 abstentions, and 6 (U.S., U.K., Portugal, South Africa, France, and Australia) against.

The U.S. while observing the arms embargo continues to oppose general sanctions against South Africa as ineffective "either economically or politically." In the view of the U.S. "... pressure must be maintained against South Africa, but in practical and peaceful ways."

Other UN bodies concerned with southern African issues are also directing attention to the "main trading partners" of South Africa. The Unit on Apartheid of the UN Secretariat, for example, has circulated a study on "Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa." The study singles out U.S. and U.K. investments and trade with South Africa and, in its concentration on U.S. and U.K. involvement, typifies much of the UN's approach to the southern African situation.

While African states may be convinced that an attack on economic interests in southern Africa is the most effective means for achieving majority rule, there may be a second motive. Some black African States, particularly those bordering the "white redoubt," see South Africa's foreign policy as menacing their own security. They believe it is in their own interest therefore to weaken that country's economic and military capabilities. But are these two separate issues? Attempts to weaken South Africa militarily and economically may be one way to strengthen the security of neighboring African states, but are such measures the best way to achieve self-determination or representative government? Or would other measures be more effective?

African states in the United Nations are also engaged in generating increased support to the "victims of racial oppression." In the mid-1960s, two Trust Funds were established. One for South Africa, offers legal assistance to persons "under the repressive and discriminatory legislation" of South Africa; relief and education to such persons; and relief to refugees from South Africa. A second fund, the United Na-

tions Educational and Training Programme, assists refugees from South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese Territories. A total of over \$3 million has been received by these Funds. At the 25th General Assembly a third fund, the UN Fund for Namibia was created. It is envisaged as providing a "comprehensive programme of assistance to Namibians in various fields," especially with regard to "future administrative responsibilities in the Territory." The 26th General Assembly is expected to vote the fund into operation, after a report by the Secretary-General has been considered concerning financial arrangements.

Military assistance to Portugal through NATO and bilateral programs is also coming under concerted attack at the United Nations. The latest resolution on this subject at the 25th General Assembly session appealed to all States, "in particular members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:"

- (a) "To desist forthwith from the training of Portuguese military personnel ...;
- (b) To prevent the sale or supply of weapons, military equipment and material, including aircraft, helicopters and vehicles, to the Government of Portugal ...;
- (c) To desist from any collaboration with the ground, air and naval forces of Portugal ..."

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 94—6 with 16 abstentions. Those voting against the resolution were Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.

Here again the U.S. was ostensibly "on the defensive" in refusing to support a resolution professing to promote freedom in southern Africa. Indeed, while the U.S. often abstains on such resolutions, the U.S. voted against this one. Furthermore the fact that the U.S. cast its first veto in the Security Council on a southern African issue (Rhodesia) did little to enhance our position with the African States. (This veto is discussed further in the section on Southern Rhodesia.) The Soviet Union, on the other hand, nearly always votes with the African States, including both the above resolutions.

On the other hand, U.S. Ambassador Yost's May 1970 statement

on U.S. policy toward Namibia (discussed further in the section on Namibia) helped somewhat to maintain U.S. credibility on these issues. But African states are likely to intensify their focus on "the main trading partners" of the white minority governments; on military assistance to Portugal; and on additional and greater support to the liberation movements. Thus, U.S. economic involvement in all southern Africa, and military support to Portugal, are likely to remain under attack, especially at the United Nations.

At the same time African states will probably continue to try to force stronger and even more strident resolutions through the United Nations — resolutions which often center on rhetoric rather than on constructive and politically feasible programs. If this pattern is maintained, it will mean that the U.S. will continue to be on record as opposed to or abstaining on a number of African sponsored drafts.

Southern African issues are also being raised in the context of the UN Specialized Agencies and center around attempts by the African states to isolate South Africa from the international community. South Africa, for example, has already withdrawn under pressure from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Attempts have also been made to exclude the Republic from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). An attempt was even made to exclude her from the 1970 General Assembly session when the Assembly refused to recognize the credentials of the South African representatives. However, as interpreted by the President of the General Assembly, this move was only "a very strong condemnation of the policies pursued by the Government of South Africa" and did "not affect the rights and privileges of membership of South Africa."

Despite these efforts, South Africa remains a member of about 38 intergovernmental organizations.

B. In Regional Organizations

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has played an important role in the conciliation of potentially dangerous inter-African disputes and in helping ease tensions between African states. A viable OAU may in fact be a prerequisite to the development of an inter-African peacekeeping force.

Thwarted by attempts at forceful action through the UN on southern African issues, African States also use the forum of the OAU as a platform for their policies.

Among resolutions adopted by the OAU at its June 1971 meetings were those 1) urging a special meeting of the Security Council in furtherance of the World Court's advisory opinion on Namibia and urging that the OAU send a delegation of Foreign Ministers to that meeting; and 2) condemning "the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany and France for ... their assistance to the Portuguese regime ..."

Perhaps the most dramatic event at this June OAU meeting was the discussion and vote on the issue of dialogue with South Africa.

In the past the OAU has, with near unanimity, maintained that dialogue should not take place with South Africa without prior OAU approval and without evidence that South Africa was consulting its own black population. But at this meeting, a resolution affirming this OAU position was adopted with six members voting against (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, and Madagascar) and five abstaining (Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta, and Swaziland). The OAU resolution suggests that the "proposal for a dialogue between the independent African States and the racist minority regime of South Africa is a manoeuvre by that regime and its allies to divide African states, confuse world public opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in Southern Africa."

President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Dr. Kamuzu Banda, President of Malawi, have been the most outspoken advocates of dialogue. Malawi is the only black African state which has full diplomatic relations with South Africa, although Prime Minis-

ter Vorster is known to have made overtures to others including the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, Uganda, and Ghana.

Whether South Africa has succeeded in driving a wedge in black Africa's unanimous opposition to her government's policies or whether the OAU has succeeded in drawing the Ivory Coast and others away from their extended position on dialogue with South Africa is unclear.

The Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, attended by representatives and observers from 65 nations, held its September 1970 session in Lusaka, Zambia. It devoted a major portion of its discussion to southern African issues and adopted, among others, resolutions on Apartheid, the Portuguese Territories, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The Conference was particularly concerned with Britain's new Conservative Government's announced intention to resume arms sales to South Africa. It was agreed that the Chairman, Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, should tour Western capitals, including the U.S., to attempt to persuade them to refrain from selling arms to South Africa; from giving any support direct or indirect to South Africa, Rhodesia, or Portugal; and if involved, to withdraw from the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Mozambique. President Kaunda did contact several of these Governments. However, Britain decided to renew arms sales to South Africa and France's decision of October 1970 to place an embargo on small arms, helicopter, and armoured car sales to South Africa is thought to be due in part to the fact she had already sold certain licenses to South Africa which rendered these sales less relevant. In June 1971, for example, South Africa received a license to produce Mirage fighter aircraft locally.

Apart from these efforts to exert political leverage on the Western powers, the OAU has established a Liberation Committee which is the focal point for discussion and planning and for the dispersal of funds to the liberation movements.

C. In U.S. Domestic Policy

The history and identity of 22 million Americans have roots reaching back to Africa. America's black population is in fact greater than the population of any African state except that of Ethiopia,

Nigeria, and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

It is true, of course, that at present most Americans are still primarily concerned with domestic issues, civil rights, equal opportunities, etc. But the concern and interest of black Americans on southern African issues is developing and likely to increase as awareness of the situation grows. New classes in African history, culture, and politics are being taught in the schools and universities and have created a stronger concern for her people among black Americans.

The NAACP, for example, at its 1971 National Convention voted to engage in a peaceful protest against South African sportsmen who compete in the U.S., and voiced its opposition to the South African sugar quota. The first black director of General Motors has taken the public position that "The South African government should be told that apartheid must come to an end, or else, office by office, plant by plant, business by business, we should get out." The Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) returned from a four week trip to Africa in August 1971 and called for a "United African Appeal" whose program would include organizing black Americans to influence the U.S. Government on African issues. He also suggested that black GIs could be used in Guinea Bissau against "Portuguese attacks." The thirteen black members of Congress have formed a Black Caucus which has been active on a number of southern African issues. In March 1971 the Caucus met with President Nixon and submitted sixty recommendations for Government action, among which were several concerning Africa. Black American scholars in the recently founded African Heritage Studies Association are also pressing for a more active role in the formulation and conduct of American policy toward Africa.

This type of action indicates that the concern among black Americans with Africa and African issues is already substantial. But their **potential** interest in African affairs — particularly southern Africa — is even greater. For as more Americans — black and white — achieve full social, economic, and political rights in this country, more are likely to direct their attention to the conditions under which blacks are living elsewhere, and to question the nature of U.S. involve-

ment in southern Africa. This in turn is likely to have an important impact on elected officials, on party platforms, and thus on U.S. policy.


Trade unions, too, are involved in African affairs. The AFL-CIO has established the African-American Labor Center to assist the African labor movement in its efforts to promote the economic and social development of the continent. Its assistance included support to a refugee center and intensive labor education programs in Botswana. As early as 1963 the AFL-CIO passed a resolution on "The Remaining Struggles for National Freedom in Africa" in which having found conditions of "forced labor" and "inhuman low wage levels" in South Africa, they called for a world-wide maritime boycott of all South African goods.

Church groups and individual company employees have already developed rather well organized programs for applying pressures on certain American companies with business dealings in South Africa. Pressures have been brought to bear on Po.aroid Corporation for example and are discussed in the section on South Africa. Gulf Oil Corporation is coming under concerted attack by a number of church groups for its operation in Angolan Cabinda. A campaign was waged at Gulf's April 1971 meeting which included a proposal that Gulf "establish a Committee to examine Gulf involvement in Portuguese Africa." A proxy solicitation was carried out by the Task Force on Southern Africa of The United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. and the Project on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. While unsuccessful, the proposal and proxy solicitation did enlist sympathetic attention to the problem from several major institutions and organizations including Princeton University.

In dealing with southern Africa there is always the possibility that another Sharpeville³ or other violent flashpoint could set off reactions in the U.S. that might raise even stronger concerns about U.S. policy.

³ In March 1960, 69 blacks were killed and 180 wounded while protesting South Africa's pass laws. This set off a series of violent incidents which were effectively suppressed by the South African police.

4. Principle Issues and Recommendations for U.S. Policy



The issues with which we are concerned in the white-ruled areas of southern Africa are racial equality and representative government. The issue is not how much or how little the white governments seem to be doing for their non-white populations. Rather it is the inherent, basic right of these people to govern themselves — as they choose. Or to put it the other way around, the issue is the relinquishment by the whites in southern Africa of absolute power. This is unlikely to happen out of sheer magnanimity; the question is whether the transition can occur without serious violence.

The alternative to violence is not the resignation of blacks to a sub-human existence, but the willingness of whites to enter into a process of negotiation with non-whites which would lead to the sharing of political, economic, and social power. The Panel believes that responsibility for the use of violence, if it comes in southern Africa, will lie not with the non-whites — not with those who are struggling for their basic human freedoms — but with those who are denying those freedoms and have long used violence as an instrument of their oppression.*

In formulating the recommendations which follow, we have been mindful of the limitations of U.S. power and influence. Solutions to the conditions which exist in southern Africa must be developed by the whites and non-whites of the area working together. The U.S. can, however, offer aid and encouragement to internal forces for change and, at the same time, ensure that its policies in no way support the oppressive policies of the white minority governments.

*For comment by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 86.

The recommendations which follow have been formulated in the hope that the white minority governments of southern Africa can be persuaded through non-violent measures to share their absolute power.

A. South Africa

Although a high degree of racial discrimination has existed in South Africa for many decades, its unrelenting codification, as the official government policy of apartheid, dates to 1948 when the National Party won political control. Apartheid means first of all rigid white versus non-white segregation, with the franchise (and land owning rights in 87 per cent of the land) reserved to whites. It further distinguishes among the non-whites — coloreds, Indians, blacks — and prescribes that the blacks may enjoy “separate development” with full political rights in African Reserves or “Bantustans” (the Government prefers the term “homelands”) which make up 13 per cent of the land area.⁴

Apartheid and the development of Bantustans — or “separate development” — are the means by which the National Party intends to maintain “white supremacy” and white control. As Prime Minister Vorster said during the 1970 election campaign, “But we are building a nation for whites only. We have a right to our own identity just as blacks and other non-whites have a right to theirs. Black people are entitled to political rights, but only over their own people — not my people.”

There is, however, a great gap between the theory and the reality of Bantustans. The Bantustans are generally not considered to be viable economic entities. Most lack adequate arable land, natural resources, and industry, and are often not even internally contiguous. But even more important is the fact that non-white labor is an economic necessity in the so-called white areas. The result is the break-up

⁴ According to South African Government spokesmen, the reserves are in different stages of political development, with the Transkei the most politically advanced. It has a Legislative Assembly which is partly elected.



After South African Institute of Race Relations

of families, with "superfluous" (i.e., non-working) wives and children living in the Bantustans while their husbands and fathers work in the white areas. There they live in "bachelor" barracks eleven months of the year and have no political rights. The Government is attempting to set up "border industries" on the edge of the Bantustans, thereby limiting the necessity for black labor in the white areas. But the success of the "border industries" is in doubt.*

Despite strenuous Government efforts to remove blacks from the white areas to the Bantustans, the 1970 South African census shows only 6.9 million black South Africans in the reserves and 8 million in the white areas. It is also interesting to note from these same census statistics that South Africa's black population increased by 4 million since the 1960 census. This increase is greater than the entire white population.⁵

According to Government spokesmen, the African reserves will permit each major black ethnic group (the 15 million blacks are broken down into eight such groupings) to develop separately and thus preserve its own distinct identity, culture, history, and language. In theory, each reserve will eventually be granted independence — after certain criteria have been fulfilled. It is unclear, however, whether authority over such matters as defense and foreign affairs would ever be granted. The distinctions among South Africa's black groups appear to be more obvious and more significant to white South African Government officials than they do to many black South Africans. In fact, the Government places such great emphasis on the diversity of its black population, it gives the appearance to many that the concept of divide and rule is an unstated policy.

The unworkability of separate development and apartheid is highlighted in the treatment of South Africa's colored population. South Africa's 2 million coloreds, most of whom live in the Cape area, are the result of racial mixing in the early days of white settlement. They have no special language or culture, nor a "homeland" to return to. Yet they suffer many of the same discriminations as the

⁵ There are approximately 3.8 million white, 15 million black, 2 million colored, and 600,000 Asian South Africans.

*For comment by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 86.

black population. They too have been forced to move from homes in areas now classified as "white" where many have lived for decades. They are segregated in education, restricted in job opportunities, and denied political integration and full citizenship.

The "colored problem," i.e., the future position of the coloreds within the white community, has become a subject of intense political concern in South Africa — one with a potential for dividing the National Party. Already many within the National Party, and even in the Cabinet, have begun to call for full citizenship for the coloreds.

The whites of South Africa are not a monolithic group. They are divided by language — 60 percent Afrikaans speaking (of Dutch origin) and 40 percent English speaking. And they are divided politically. There are within South Africa numerous groups, organizations, and individuals who are devoted to their country but are opposed to apartheid and are working within the law, though often harassed, to establish racial justice and equality. They lack political power but have long been an important force (e.g., through the press) working for the evolution of racial accommodation and equal rights.

On the other hand, there are dissident forces within the ruling National Party who support an even more restrictive interpretation of apartheid. During the 1970 election they formed a separate party known as the Herstigte National Party (HNP) and put up their own candidates — all of whom were defeated. This is significant since it indicates that the so-called "verkrampste" or narrow-minded group within the National Party has lost out.

Prime Minister Vorster, in spite of his vigorous enforcement of apartheid, is identified with the "verligtes" or more enlightened forces of the Party mainly because of his "outward-looking" foreign policy. South Africa sees itself as a nation surrounded by hostile forces. Its security interests lie therefore in maintaining as deep a buffer zone as possible between South Africa and the more openly hostile black nations to the north, and reducing this hostility wherever possible. A major thrust of Prime Minister Vorster's "outward-looking" foreign policy is the improvement of relations with other black African States. In this connection he has espoused the idea of "dialogue" between

cent. The difference is due largely to the Government's unwillingness to relax restrictions on the employment and advancement of black labor. This "growth versus apartheid" argument was an important issue in the 1970 elections and remains one of the most sensitive issues in South African politics today. Mr. Willie Marais, economic spokesman for the verkrampste (HNP) Party, the right wing breakaway from the National Party, said "We say the growth rate should be geared to the availability of local White labour." "If we improve the efficiency of the White labour pool, we could still grow at 2.5 to 3.5 percent a year." HNP candidates were defeated in the election but the argument over the use of non-white labor goes on.

South African businessmen are restive under the constraints of the Government's job reservation laws which limit the jobs that can be held by non-whites. The shortage of white labor is, in fact, so severe, that some disregard of these laws is often tolerated. Harry Oppenheimer, multimillionaire head of the Anglo-American Corporation, attacked job reservation as not making "proper use of 80 percent of [South Africa's] potential working population" "We have got to make a proper use of our labor," he added. "This cannot be done if we persist in the traditional way of life in South Africa which in the economic field appears to consist of a long process of suicide."

Prime Minister Vorster has made it clear that industrialists cannot expect a relaxation of the Government's labor policy although some infringement of the laws is countenanced. In fact, the Government remains unbendable in its legal attitude but flexible in the implementation of its labor policy. "It is necessary," Vorster said in September 1970, "for businessmen to face political realities" and not look at South Africa "exclusively through economic spectacles." In other words, the Prime Minister has acknowledged that a certain amount of economic growth and development must be sacrificed in order to maintain white supremacy in South Africa.

* * *

What should U.S. policy be toward South Africa?

What is the appropriate role for the U.S. in its commercial, governmental, and private relations with a nation whose system of government is based upon the racial oppression of nearly 18 million of

its own people?

The Panel's recommendations which follow are in no way an attempt to develop a "solution" to the situation which now exists. They are an attempt to suggest policies which we feel could be helpful in deflecting South Africa away from its present repressive course. In truth, the U.S. can only be supportive of the forces for change. The real forces for change must come from within South Africa itself — from its own people, white and non-white alike.

The Panel believes that U.S. policy should in no way encourage or support the present system of racial segregation and discrimination in South Africa and further, that the U.S. must, within the limitations of its own influence, attempt to promote policies which could assist in the achievement of basic human rights for all South Africans.

But herein lies the fundamental problem. While there is world-wide condemnation of apartheid there is honest disagreement over the most effective means for achieving racial equality and self-determination.

How change can best be accomplished in South Africa is not only a difficult but perhaps somewhat irrelevant question — since the "best" means are not likely to be used. Some feel the answer is international force, some that boycott and isolation will force a change in governmental policy, and some that peaceful pressures and persuasion are most likely to effect change. Many feel that change will be achieved episodically, through a combination of peaceful and violent means; others that some unforeseen event could set off a major conflagration. Unfortunately, the ultimate goal of racial equality and respect for individual human rights in South Africa is too often lost in arguments over the means.

The use of international force does not at present appear to be a real option. Other African states lack the military means to invade South Africa; the Russians or Chinese are unlikely to come forward unilaterally with the type and amount of military power which would be required; and the U.S. and other major Western powers are unwilling to take on the burdens of such forceful measures. U.S. policy is clear. In his Report to The Congress of February 1971, President

Nixon said:

"We are convinced that the use of violence holds no promise as the solution to the problems of southern Africa. Neither the military nor the economic strength is available to force change on the white minority regimes."

The U.S. needs to make equally clear, however, its unwillingness to use force in defense of the present South African Government (or any succeeding white supremacy regime). The Panel recommends that the U.S. Government make clear to the present Government of South Africa that the U.S. would not go to its defense or give aid in the suppression of internal revolt related to its repressive policies, and that the U.S. would not seek to oppose or hinder support for such a revolt from neighboring black African states.*

Because of South Africa's substantial military power, effective military measures against the Republic would require involvement of the great powers — including the U.S. and the USSR. This is a scenario which should be avoided.**

What then of the second option, i.e., boycott and isolation?

A boycott has been in effect against Southern Rhodesia since 1965, but it has not been effective in changing that Government's policies. It has caused serious strains in Rhodesia's economy, but its effectiveness has been limited by the fact that not all States are complying with it. To be successful, it is generally agreed that a boycott must be total and universally applied. This has not been the case in Southern Rhodesia even though it is a land-locked country. The problems of employing an effective boycott against South Africa would be far greater.

Still, there are cases of attempts to apply pressure on the South African Government by boycotting or isolating her from the international community which appear to have had some effect. For example, the barring of South Africa from the Olympic Games and the cancellation by Britain of the Springbok's (cricket team) tour have had an impact on this almost fanatically sports-minded country. Indi-

*For comment by Ruth Morgenthau and William Coleman, see page 84, and for reservation by Hans Ries, see page 90.

**For comment by William Coleman, see page 83.

vidual cricket clubs are now calling for non-racial cricket matches both internationally and domestically. International sports boycotts remind white South Africans in very direct terms that they are isolating themselves from the international community and that South Africa will not be accepted as a full member until it is ready to conform to certain international norms.

It may be that the most effective means for achieving change in South Africa is a combination of various types of measures applied as appropriate by Governments, business, private organizations, and even individuals. The Panel believes there may be no one "right" course that would apply across the board to the totality of interrelations with South Africa. A boycott in sports and a strengthening of exchange programs may both be helpful in promoting change. Consistency in this case is not necessarily a virtue. Rather, the "rightness" of any particular course of action should be judged on the basis of its ability to assist in the realization of racial equality and representative government in South Africa. The Panel has attempted to make its own recommendations on this basis.

Investments

Official U.S. Government policy states that it neither encourages nor discourages U.S. investment in South Africa.

The important question, however, to which this report must address itself is whether U.S. investment in South Africa accelerates or delays progress toward the development of a multiracial society.

Very briefly, those who oppose U.S. investment in South Africa do so on the basis of one or more of the following grounds: investment and trade are potential arms of political policy and should be used as such; withdrawing investments would weaken South Africa economically, morally, and therefore politically; economic growth over the past several years has not resulted in greater freedom or real economic advancement for non-whites; continued U.S. investments will increase the likelihood that if and when the confrontation between white and black comes the U.S. Government will be forced to support the status quo; withdrawal of U.S. investments would strike

a moral and psychological blow to South Africa, which presently enjoys the prestige of U.S. business interests; and finally that we should take a "moral position" and do what is right because it is right.

Those who support continued U.S. investments do so on the grounds that: investment and trade should not be used as an arm of political policy; as the economy develops both the South African Government and the private sector will be forced to employ more non-white labor and in more skilled positions — thereby increasing their wages and skills, and thus their economic opportunities and eventually their political power; more can be accomplished through contact and dialogue than through isolation; not investing or withdrawal of investments by U.S. companies will only mean that companies from other nations would fill the vacuum; non-whites would be hurt more than whites by lack of investment; and morality lies not in simple and possibly counterproductive adherence to abstract principles but rather in concrete steps that may actually, if slowly, improve the lot of South Africa's blacks and gain them freedom and equal rights to which they are entitled.

It is difficult to arrive at a clear judgement as to which of these arguments holds the greatest validity. Perhaps the answer lies with elements of both arguments.

It is relevant, however, to any discussion of withdrawal of American investments to note that under South African Government laws the loss of employment or even change in employment can result in a non-white South African being forced to leave the area in which he resides even though he may have lived there continuously for many years. The loss of jobs subsequent to American business withdrawal would therefore be a matter of great and immediate impact on individual non-white South African employees and must be weighed heavily against any potential longer range benefits of such withdrawal. Also relevant is the fact that an attempt by an American company to withdraw its investments could result in blocked rands (South Africa's currency) under her exchange control rulings. This could be circumvented in many cases but not without difficulty and delay — probably of at least five years. Where larger amounts of money are involved,

special action by the South African Government would be required.

For better or worse, the questions raised concerning investments in South Africa are not only economic, but moral and political as well. Neil Wates, Managing Director of Wates Limited, one of Britain's biggest building and construction companies, whose firm had been invited to invest in South Africa, visited South Africa and returned convinced that it should not do so. He saw South Africa as "the ideal land for investment ... the economic outlook is excellent." Nevertheless he added:

"The idea of doing business in South Africa is totally unacceptable to me.

"We could not be true to the basic principles on which we run our business and we should lose our integrity in the process. We should have to operate within a social climate where the color of a man's skin is his most important attribute and where there is virtually no communication between the races.

"We should have to operate within an economic climate which is designed deliberately to demoralise and to maintain an industrial helotry; we should, in turn, profit from such exploitation and ultimately end up with a vested interest in its maintenance."

Although Mr. Wates might not be considered typical of the average businessman, the Panel agrees with his basic moral arguments against new investment. There may be persuasive political and economic arguments as well.

On strictly economic terms, it is true that a business concern can often see a clear return on its initial investment in a very short period of time. But this must be balanced against the company's domestic business interests, as well as its business interests worldwide — particularly in the rest of Africa. Investment in South Africa may ultimately foreclose future business opportunities in other parts of the Continent.

Japan's 1971 liberalized overseas investment measures were "made not to be applicable to ... South Africa." This is probably due,

in part, to an awareness of the reaction to such investments in the United Nations from those countries opposing apartheid — particularly those from the Afro-Asian bloc of which Japan considers itself a part.

The Panel recommends that under present circumstances American business not place new investments in South Africa and that the U.S. Government actively discourage new investments.*

A possible exception to this recommendation is the suggestion that American companies might invest directly in the Bantustans or reserve areas. This, the argument goes, would provide jobs for blacks, assist in developing the economies of the Bantustans and test the willingness of the South African Government to permit the Bantustans to develop true independence. Under present South African law direct white business investment in the reserves is restricted and the required infrastructure is nearly non-existent. Nevertheless, direct American investment in the Bantustans is a suggestion which requires further inquiry and might be one of the subjects studied by the Task Force referred to later in this report.

American companies which have already invested in South Africa are faced with many of the same issues as those making an initial decision to invest but with additional questions as well. In making its recommendations the Panel therefore has differentiated between new and existing investments.

We feel it is worth testing the hypothesis that American companies presently operating in South Africa can, through enlightened business practices, help improve the economic and social condition of non-white South Africans and have an eroding effect on apartheid practices — to test whether, in fact, there is such a thing as “good” versus “bad” investment.

In most cases, however, the test will require more enlightened conduct than has generally marked the activity of American business in South Africa to date. With a few notable exceptions, the nearly 300 U.S. companies operating in South Africa are not now in the forefront of the effort to improve the economic and social lot of

*For dissent by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

their non-white South African workers. Indeed, there appears to be a tendency, dictated not locally, but by parent companies at home, to lean over backwards not to offend the South African Government.

Such a policy is not unique. The general practice for an international company is to be a "good citizen" in the countries in which it operates — according to local standards. As this is usually general corporate policy and one practiced by managers sent from country to country abroad, it is not sinister or unusual that it should be applied by American companies in South Africa.

Yet, on the specific issue of wages, a study conducted in 1969 by the Isando Industrialists Association of South Africa, which includes numerous American companies, indicated that six out of ten jobs provided wages on or below the poverty datum line as established by the South African Government.

What is lacking, we believe, is a realization in Detroit or New York or Chicago that there are options available to American business which could help improve the economic and social position of non-white South Africans — options which are all within South African laws. American companies could, for example, assist their non-white employees by:

1. giving equal pay for equal work⁸ (it is estimated that at least 50 percent of urban black South Africans live on or below the poverty datum line);
2. providing hot lunches, improved medical care, pension programs, and disability insurance;
3. indicating a willingness to recognize collective bargaining and facilitate the organization of African "works committees," which are provided for by law. Blacks are not allowed to be members of registered unions. They are prohibited by law from striking and from representing employees on an industrial council or at proceedings of a conciliation board;

⁸ The Standard Bank (South African affiliate of the Chase Manhattan Bank) and Barclays Bank recently announced that all non-white employees will now get equal pay with whites for the same job. This, however, will apply only to clerical staff.

4. providing on-the-job training and undertaking vocational training programs for non-whites;
5. advancing and promoting non-whites as quickly as possible to responsible positions;
6. abolishing petty apartheid practices — desegregating all social functions.

The Panel recommends that American companies already operating in South Africa adopt progressive labor practices with a view toward improving the economic and social condition of their non-white employees and assisting the forces for change. The goal of such company programs should be full equality of non-white employee practices with white employee practices.*

The implementation of such a program would require the strong support of company headquarters in the U.S. and of managers on the scene. We recommend that American companies appoint as managers of their South African affiliates only those who are willing to work for change and are committed to the implementation of fair labor practices.

The Panel is aware that such a program is open to abuse and will require not only a strong and serious effort on the part of American business, but also the strong advocacy of the U.S. Government.

It is possible that some American companies wishing to adopt such a program, but finding it difficult to rationalize in terms of cost to stockholders, would welcome prodding from the U.S. Government in the form of specific directives. This would place a large part of the responsibility for adopting the program on the shoulders of the U.S. Government and off the shoulders of corporate executives. We believe the U.S. Government should take an active role in assisting American companies to adopt such programs, in establishing guidelines against which they can be evaluated, and in monitoring their development.

Furthermore, the Panel urges that all U.S. groups and organizations concerned with apartheid and racial discrimination — and particularly the American labor movement in its tradition of active concern

*For reservation by William Coleman, see page 83.

with the betterment of working conditions throughout the world — become concerned with the need for American companies to adopt a program of fair labor practices in their South African operations. A concerted effort on the part of private U.S. organizations vis-a-vis such a program could have considerable impact on companies with discriminatory labor practices in South Africa. The Panel also recommends that concerned stockholders take advantage of the annual shareholders' meetings to bring to public light the matter of employment practices and conditions in South Africa.

Polaroid Corporation has adopted a program vis-a-vis its non-white employees in South Africa which is similar, in part, to that suggested above. Although they have not committed themselves to equal pay for equal work, they have raised the wages of their black employees by between 17 and 33 percent. Other parts of the Polaroid program include committing a portion of their profits earned in South Africa to educational programs for blacks and to helping create "a black-managed company in one or more of the free black African nations." Perhaps the most enduring and meaningful innovation is Polaroid's attempt to enlist other major American companies with investments in South Africa to take similar action. It is unclear at this point what the response to this latter effort will be. But it is particularly interesting to note that Polaroid, which enjoys a reputation for "enlightened" labor practices and race relations, was stimulated to adopt such a program through pressures applied by a group of its own employees.

We commend Polaroid's decision to withdraw the sale of products "which might be used, directly or indirectly, in enforcing a policy of apartheid." In Polaroid's case, this included its ID system which had become identified with the Passbooks required of all blacks.⁹

Each American company operating in South Africa should assess the use to which its products are employed in terms of the Government's apartheid policy. Any products used directly or indirectly in support of apartheid or racial discrimination — particularly those used

⁹ Every black South African 16 years of age and older is required to carry, at all times, a reference book which incorporates his identity card; information on where the holder is entitled to be and, if appropriate, to work; his work record; payment of taxes, etc. In 1968-69, an average of 1,732 persons were prosecuted **per day** for infringement of the "pass laws."

by the police or military — should be withheld from the South African market.*

Polaroid regards its program as an “experiment” which it intends to evaluate in about a year’s time. The program was initiated in January 1971.** In a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senior Vice President of Polaroid said:

“We are not sure what the longer term decision will be regarding Polaroid’s relationship with South Africa, but we are convinced that the basic approach of working for change from within deserves this kind of trial.”

The Panel recognizes that if American companies pay higher salaries and give greater benefits than some of their competitors, they may suffer possible loss of markets or of profits. There may also be marginal American operations in South Africa which depend upon sub-standard wages and working conditions in order to make a profit. The Panel recommends that American companies operating in South Africa which would find the adoption of a program of fair labor practices economically unfeasible withdraw their investments.*** U.S. business should not, within the framework of its own domestic labor practices and in the context of its social responsibility, rely on racially discriminatory labor practices in other parts of the world to make a profit.

Information concerning the amount of financing undertaken by American financial institutions in southern Africa or the scope of projects underwritten is unavailable. It is known that consortium loans have been made to various projects involving the South African Government. The Panel recommends that U.S. banks and other financial institutions refuse to accord any financing to South African Government subsidiaries or to Government sponsored commercial or military projects. (This recommendation should apply to Portuguese Africa as well.)

*For reservation by Ruth Morgenthau, see page 85.

**For comment by Brad Skinner, see page 91.

***For dissent by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

In spite of our qualified support for an attempt to achieve some change in South Africa through enlightened labor practices by those businesses presently operating in South Africa, a more fundamental concern remains.

It may be that no efforts by American business and others can have any important effect on a determined governmental political effort within South Africa to continue its policies of oppression and racial discrimination. American companies may find they are faced with a continuing deterioration of the political and social situation and that progress is not being made towards racial equality. Furthermore, another Sharpeville or turmoil within the neighboring African states accompanied by a South Africa military threat could create a situation in which the presence of American businesses in the Republic raised serious questions as to this country's involvement. Changes are taking place in South Africa but their direction and real impact on the economic, social, and political condition of the non-whites is unclear. As the situation develops, both the U.S. Government and U.S. business will need to reevaluate the wisdom of a continued American business presence in South Africa. Withdrawal, however difficult, may yet be required.

The Panel recommends therefore that political, economic, and social developments in South Africa be continuously monitored and that the impact of American companies on the situation there be reviewed and evaluated. This revision should take place within as brief a time as possible — probably in about two years. The Panel further recommends that such a review and evaluation be carried out by a U.S. Government Interdepartmental Task Force on Southern Africa. The Task Force which is discussed in more detail later in this report would serve as an ongoing mechanism to review southern African issues. Priority consideration by the Task Force, however, should be given to the monitoring of U.S. companies in their adoption of fair and non-racial labor practices and to evaluating their potential impact on non-white South African workers.

Under ordinary circumstances, some American companies already operating in South Africa would tend to expand their opera-

tions either because of competitive pressures or favorable profit potentials. Given the high rate of return, such expansion could probably be financed internally, with no additional equity investment from the United States. The Panel recommends, however, that pending a review by the Task Force, and in recognition of the possible need for ultimate withdrawal, American companies not invest in any major expansion of existing facilities.*

As has already been mentioned, the U.S. is only one of several nations involved in South Africa. Both our involvement and influence are limited. Effective pressures to bring about change in South Africa's racial policies require concerted international action. For example, even complete withdrawal of American investments would be unlikely to have much effect if companies from other countries simply operated in their stead. If effective international action is to be taken, it must, if possible, be done cooperatively.

We recommend that the U.S. Government review questions concerning the impact and future of international companies operating in South Africa with other investing nations. The U.S. might initiate such discussions in GATT and the OECD as well as in the UN. It has been suggested for example that an international conference be convened to draft an "International Code for Businessmen."¹⁰ This is another subject which might be considered by the Task Force on Southern Africa.

Trade

U.S. trade with South Africa represents 17 percent of South Africa's imports and 13 percent of her exports — yet less than one percent of our total imports or exports.

There is some trade between East European countries, the USSR, and Mainland China and South Africa. Much of the Chinese trade is in gold. Although this trade between South Africa and Communist countries is small, it reflects a cynicism which often exists in dealing

¹⁰See Michael Rlesman, "Polaroid Power: Taxing Business for Human Rights," **Foreign Policy**, No. 4, Fall 1971, pp. 101-110.

*For dissent by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

with South African issues — cynicism on the part of South Africa which claims to be a bastion of anti-communism on the African continent and cynicism on the part of the Communist nations which attack Western involvement in South Africa as if they were totally uninvolved.

Many of the same arguments which are used to support or attack U.S. investment in South Africa are used in relation to U.S. trade.

However, although trade and investment are intimately connected, there is a distinction between the international flow of goods and services across borders and the problems of an industrial enterprise which becomes, in effect, a "citizen" of the country in which it operates. In addition, trade boycotts, unless universally applied, have proven to be almost completely ineffective in their major purpose and can lead to world-wide trade distortions. This is true whether the country is South Africa, Cuba, or Mainland China. In spite of this the Panel believes that each company must itself judge the wisdom of trading with South Africa — particularly if, as discussed earlier, its products are used, in any way, to increase the effectiveness of the military or internal security of the Government. **The Panel recommends that the U.S. Government not underwrite trade with South Africa but, rather, encourage trade with independent Africa.***

Unfortunately, U.S. encouragement of trade with South Africa presently exists in the form of Export-Import Bank guarantees and insurance to facilitate U.S. exports. **The Panel welcomes the fact that the Bank no longer provides direct loans to South Africa and recommends that the guarantees and insurance to U.S. private lenders against business and political risks for U.S. exports also be discontinued.**

The U.S. has five economic/commercial officers in South Africa, two in Johannesburg, two in Pretoria, and one in Capetown. Their purpose, among others, is to assist and facilitate American business. They report trade opportunities, prepare world-wide directory reports, and handle inquiries from U.S. businessmen. The officers also report major economic, commercial, and political developments in South Africa and engage in representational functions on behalf of

*For comment by Ruth Morgenthau, see page 86.

U.S. business. One effect of the work of these staffs has been to facilitate U.S. business in South Africa — business which has in large part acted in accord with the Government's policies of racial oppression. We do not believe it is an appropriate role for U.S. economic/commercial officers in the present circumstances to encourage U.S. trade with South Africa.

If American business makes the decision to become a force for change there could be a useful and appropriate role for U.S. economic/commercial officers in South Africa which would include advising and assisting American companies in adopting progressive American labor practices within the laws of the South African Government.

The Panel recommends that U.S. economic/commercial officers in South Africa be directed to assist those U.S. companies operating in South Africa to adopt more progressive labor practices and to become a more effective force for change.

* * *

In a country where three quarters of the population is non-white, it seems entirely inappropriate for large U.S. Government-sponsored functions to exclude non-whites, as occurred in May 1971 at an American Embassy party where 250 white guests were invited. We recommend that there be no racial discrimination at U.S. Government-sponsored functions in South Africa and that efforts be made to include non-whites at all such functions.

There are a number of other measures which might be adopted by our Government which could either 1) increase pressures upon the South African Government; 2) minimize any direct or indirect support we might presently be giving the South African Government; 3) lend support to the forces for change; or 4) limit U.S. involvement and thereby interest in the maintenance of the status quo.

The following recommendations are not inclusive, but suggestive of the types of non-violent action which this Panel believes the U.S. Government ought to adopt in order to assist the process of change in South Africa.

The Sugar Quota

The South African sugar quota is a form of direct support by the U.S. Government to the South African Government via its sugar industry. During the past eight years, this has amounted to over \$25 million, representing a subsidy to a developed nation with a flourishing economy whose racial policies the U.S. Government has condemned. The Panel feels that this kind of Government action can only increase skepticism at home and abroad over U.S. policy toward southern Africa.

During the summer of 1971, the House and the Senate both voted to extend the over 57,000 ton South African sugar quota for three years, guaranteeing that another \$8.6 million will be received by South Africa during that time. A Senate attempt to cancel the South Africa sugar quota was narrowly defeated.

The President is empowered to revoke the quota, but an immediate move seems unlikely. The Administration has implied, however, that since over the next three years a number of arrangements governing world sugar trade are to be terminated or reviewed, its policy on the allocations of the sugar quota might be substantially altered at the end of the period. The Panel recommends, in the strongest possible terms, that South Africa's sugar quota be revoked. Furthermore, we recommend that South Africa's share be reallocated to other African nations, such as Swaziland, whose present quota is quite modest, and whose economy would benefit greatly from an increase in its quota.*

NASA Facilities

Economic, technological, or other dependencies on the South African Government complicate our commitment to racial equality because they tend to develop an interest in the status quo. In this sense, it is unwise for the U.S. to maintain or develop satellite tracking stations in South Africa.

NASA tracking station facilities near Johannesburg are considered to be helpful but not essential. Alternate facilities have been developed by NASA in the Malagasy Republic off the coast of south-

*For reservation by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

ern Africa, and could be developed, albeit at some cost, in other areas where conditions are suitable. The Panel recommends that the tracking facilities in South Africa be phased out and alternative facilities be developed as required.

Visas

There are at present no special restrictions on the granting of U.S. visas to South Africans who travel freely and frequently to and from the U.S. Yet many Americans have in the past been, and continue to be, arbitrarily refused visas to visit South Africa. These have included artists, sportsmen, scholars, journalists, and businessmen. This situation places Americans at an obvious disadvantage and is clearly unfair.

The Panel believes that Government restrictions on travel anywhere are generally unwise and undesirable. Nevertheless, it is difficult to tolerate the present situation with regard to South Africa. Should U.S. examination of South Africa visa applications be carried out on a quid pro quo basis? The Panel recommends that various "equal treatment" measures be considered which might be put into effect in the event of future denial or inordinate delay by the South African Government in the issuance of visas to Americans.

U.S. Government Representation in the Republic

At present all official representation in South Africa is white. A black American Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs did make an official visit to South Africa in 1970, but full time black American representation in South Africa is now in order. We recommend that black Americans be assigned diplomatic and other U.S. Government posts in South Africa.

Sports

South Africa is a fanatically sports-minded country and appears to be highly vulnerable to pressures applied in this area. The July 1971 Australian demonstrations against the visiting South African Springbok team received great attention in the South African press and the 1970 decision of the Olympic Committee to bar South Africa

from Olympic competition has resulted in the South African Government announcing a new, rather convoluted policy, to bypass the Committee's requirement for teams selected through interracial national competitions.

The Panel believes that in certain areas, such as sports, a boycott or isolation-type approach may be an effective means of bringing home to influential members of the South African community the need for changes in South Africa's racial policies.

Dialogue vs. Isolation

In general, however, we do not believe the isolation of South Africa from the international community is an effective means for bringing about change. In fact, the historic and geographic isolation of South Africa is, in part, responsible for her anachronistic policies. (It still takes eleven hours by jet from Rome to Johannesburg — a jet from New York can do it in twenty-six hours with five one-hour stops in West Africa.) What is needed is greater contact and exposure for all South Africans, including South African Government officials and Afrikaner businessmen, with the rest of the world.*

The Panel recommends expanding the opportunities for contact between white and non-white South Africans with the rest of the world, through government to government programs as well as through private initiatives.

International artists, writers, and scholars should be encouraged to visit South Africa and to expound their views and opinions whenever possible, and South African artists should be encouraged to visit other countries. International performers might stipulate that they would perform only before racially integrated audiences or that the proceeds from their shows be used to support black South African artist groups.

Perhaps the most persuasive argument against isolation of South Africa comes from those whites in South Africa (perhaps 10 percent of the population), including many young people, who are working for racial equality and who are opposed to apartheid. Many fear iso-

*For reservation by Ruth Morgenthau and William Coleman, see page 84.

lation of South Africa will only entrench Government policies and cause South Africans to retreat into a "laager" mentality.*

Sale of Arms

The U.S. has maintained an arms embargo against South Africa since 1963 when the Security Council called upon all States "to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."

We are disturbed by indications that the U.S. Government "would consider licenses for limited numbers of small unarmed executive civilian-type aircraft" to South Africa, as announced by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in September 1970. The fact that the light planes mentioned could be used for military reconnaissance and that \$3.1 million in sales of military items were made to South Africa in 1969 — even though such sales consisted almost entirely of spare parts for C-130 transport aircraft purchased by South Africa prior to the 1963 embargo — raises questions as to our adherence to the arms embargo. **The Panel strongly recommends that the U.S. Government maintain strict compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa and encourage others to do likewise. We believe the exception of certain items under pre-embargo contracts should be reexamined and that the decision on sales of executive-type aircraft be reconsidered and reversed.**

The South Africa Foundation

Secretary of State Rogers said in his 1970 African Policy Statement "Our investment policy ... should be deeply concerned with the social environment in which it operates." There are a number of ways in which American companies could express their concern with the environment in which they are operating in South Africa. One obvious way would be to support those South African organizations which are working to improve race relations. Unfortunately, many American companies are presently making substantial contributions to the South Africa Foundation, which attempts to rationalize the Government's

*For comment by Waldemar Nielsen, see page 90.

apartheid policy. According to its 10th Annual Report, the South Africa Foundation was organized "to promote international understanding of South Africa" and has attempted "to stem the tide of ignorance, criticism and misrepresentation against the Republic." Several major U.S. corporations are subscribing members of the Foundation. This support could hardly be termed "apolitical."

We strongly urge that American companies cease making financial contributions to the South Africa Foundation. Such support should be redirected to those South African organizations working to improve race relations or non-white education. Private, non-governmental U.S. organizations concerned with apartheid and racial discrimination might also wish to support these organizations.

* * *

We are fully aware that the recommendations suggested above can have only limited effect in bringing about racial equality in South Africa. Their adoption could, however, help bring U.S. stated policy and U.S. action into closer alignment. At a minimum they would help lessen U.S. involvement in South Africa which, in certain respects, continues to be supportive of the oppressive policies of the present regime. Hopefully, the kinds of policy we are recommending would also help the effort to move South Africa toward racial equality and representative government.

B. Namibia (South West Africa)

Territories under League of Nations mandates and not given independence at the close of World War II were placed under the United Nations Trusteeship system by individual agreement with the mandatory powers. This was accomplished in every case save one — South West Africa. The (then) Union of South Africa, the mandatory power, stated that she was under no obligation to place the territory under trusteeship and instead proposed to incorporate it into the Union. The issue was submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled in July 1966 that the two applicants (Ethiopia and Liberia) had no legal right or interest in the subject matter of



their claim. The Court did not rule on the merits of the case. African states and others who had hoped this issue could be settled by legal means were deeply disappointed by this ruling.

In October 1966 the UN General Assembly voted to terminate the Mandate, declaring "that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations." The U.S. supported this resolution. Since that time the UN has sought means for administering the territory which it renamed Namibia.

The matter came before the UN Security Council in 1968, and in 1970 the Council asked the Court for an advisory opinion on the question, "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia ...?" In a letter of 6 February, 1971, addressed to the ICJ, the South African Government proposed a plebiscite be held in Namibia to determine whether the inhabitants "wish that the Territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or should henceforth be administered by the United Nations."

The exiled leadership of SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization, a nationalist group, expressed interest in the proposal. But the plebiscite idea was immediately rejected by the UN Council for Namibia, and in May the Court officially refused the request.

It is true that the Government of South Africa has no legal right to undertake or supervise such a plebiscite. The issue is not who should administer Namibia but rather its independence, and it is noteworthy that South Africa did not even propose to accept the outcome of the plebiscite if it went against her. Nevertheless, it is possible the question of a proper plebiscite merits deeper consideration than it has been given. At a minimum forceful questions put to the South African Government and negotiations over the modalities of such a plebiscite could establish whether South Africa is indeed willing to support a free and fair opportunity for Namibians to decide on their own future.

On 21 June 1971 the ICJ handed down its advisory opinion which stated:

- “(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;
- (2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;
- (3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.”

At the 26th UN General Assembly session, Secretary of State Rogers announced the U.S. decision to accept the Court's opinion.

South Africa has for years applied its own apartheid legislation to Namibia, and in 1968 it began applying its Bantustan blueprint there, prescribing ten separate homelands for the blacks and setting them apart from the “white areas.” Ovamboland is so far the only homeland to receive limited self-government. The territory as a whole is valuable to the Republic economically, being rich in minerals and with valuable fishing and livestock interests. But its prime importance is strategic; facing on the Atlantic and bordering the Republic's Cape Province to the south, it adjoins Botswana to the east and Angola and Zambia to the north. It is from Zambia, and sometimes through Angola, that guerilla incursions from northern Namibia have moved. The Pretoria regime fears that the territory, were it relinquished, would come under hostile influences and be used as an additional staging base for guerilla attacks.

There are presently no grounds for believing South Africa will

withdraw from Namibia. In the future consideration of the impasse, however, it is conceivable that the Republic might be willing to discuss an independent Namibia on the Botswana model, i.e., as a country agreeing not to stage attacks into South Africa. Could this be a point of negotiation between the United Nations and the South African Government?

How can the UN establish its authority and administration over Namibia?

The U.S. Government has opposed the course of armed force and sought non-violent means for applying pressure on the South African Government to relinquish its control. On May 20, 1970 Ambassador Yost announced the following steps would be taken by the U.S. Government with reference to Namibia:

- “1. The United States will henceforth officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals in Namibia.
2. Export-Import Bank credit guarantees will not be made available for trade with Namibia.
3. U.S. nationals who invest in Namibia on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2145 (October 27, 1966) will not receive U.S. Government assistance in protection of such investments against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia.
4. The United States will encourage other nations to take actions similar to these.”

In announcing these steps Ambassador Yost said:

“We are under no illusion that these steps, taken alone, will quickly induce South Africa to abandon its present policy in Namibia. They should however make clear to South Africa that its illegal occupation cannot be condoned ... we are consulting with other governments on possible further moves.”

The Panel supports these decisions and believes further steps should now be taken in accord with the ICJ advisory opinion that UN Member States are under obligation to refrain from any acts which

imply recognition of the legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia.

At present the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, permits U.S. companies operating directly or indirectly in Namibia to deduct or credit, against their U.S. income taxes, taxes paid to South Africa on income earned in Namibia. Payment of taxes to governments only are permitted deductions under the Code. But the United States takes the position that South Africa is not the legitimate government of Namibia, and that its continued presence there is illegal. Clearly, it is inconsistent with our sharply defined national policy, and probably contrary to law, for the Internal Revenue Service to permit such deductions or credits. Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Internal Revenue Service be required to disallow any deductions or credits for taxes paid by U.S. firms to the South African Government on income earned by enterprises in Namibia.

Since South Africa has no legal right to impose taxes on firms operating in Namibia and the UN is presently responsible for the administration of Namibia until it achieves independence, it would be reasonable and logical for the UN to impose a tax or royalty on the profits of corporations operating in the Territory. The imposition of such a tax would enhance the UN's authority in Namibia and the proceeds could be applied to either the United Nations Educational and Training Programme, to the new UN Fund for Namibia, or be held in escrow to help finance future UN administration of Namibia. The tax might be imposed through assessment by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly.

Imposing this tax could result in the companies operating in Namibia paying taxes on the same income twice — once to the South African Government and once to the UN. If, however, the UN did impose a tax on U.S. companies operating in Namibia this tax should be deductible or creditable for U.S. income tax purposes.

Another step which should be taken in accordance with U.S. acceptance of the ICJ's advisory opinion, and in accordance with U.S. policy of discouraging investments in Namibia, is the withdrawal of

authority from our Consulates in South Africa for commercial matters concerning Namibia — even though such activity is minimal. The Panel recommends that U.S. Consulates in South Africa cease any functions in respect of U.S. commercial interests in Namibia.

The UN Council for Namibia has developed a scheme for the issuance of travel and identity documents for Namibians. Over 35 countries have agreed to recognize these documents which are in effect a kind of "United Nations Passport." We commend the U.S. decision to accept UN documents for Namibians for travel to and transit through this country.

When the United Nations Council for Namibia was established in 1967 the U.S. abstained on the resolution because it felt the Council's terms of reference were impracticable. Since then the U.S. and other Western powers have declined membership on the Council,¹¹ which has accordingly suffered in terms of status and in its capabilities for effective, realistic, and concerted action. If the terms of reference and the composition of the UN Council for Namibia could be renegotiated, the Panel believes the U.S. should accept membership on the Council and encourage other major powers to do the same in an effort to increase its effectiveness.

The recent ICJ advisory opinion provides a useful backdrop for intensified and concerted action on the part of the UN to establish its administrative authority over Namibia. In furtherance of the June 1971 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, the Panel recommends that measures for establishing the UN's authority over Namibia be intensified.

C. Southern Rhodesia

Southern Rhodesia is a land in which 250,000 whites rule 5 million blacks.

Great Britain granted self-government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 but has withheld granting independence pending a widening of

¹¹ Present membership includes: Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

the franchise for black Africans. During the early 1960s numerous attempts were made through the United Nations to convene a conference to formulate a new constitution and to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence. Nevertheless, despite protests from the UN and Great Britain, Southern Rhodesia did issue a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965. On the following day the Security Council met and adopted a resolution condemning the UDI and called on all States not to recognize the "illegal racist minority regime." The UN also established economic sanctions, which in May 1968 became comprehensive and mandatory and included a complete trade embargo. The U.S. voted for and has, to date, supported the sanctions program.

Several unsuccessful attempts have been made by Great Britain since UDI to reach agreement on terms for Rhodesian independence. The central issue has been Rhodesian refusal to accept Britain's principle of "unimpeded progress toward majority rule," but from the beginning of its differences with Southern Rhodesia, Great Britain has stated that it would never be willing to use force in this situation.

In June 1970 the Constitution as presented by Prime Minister Ian Smith in a referendum was adopted by a margin of 3 to 1. Of the nearly 5 million black population only about 6,634 are registered to vote. About 55,000 (mostly white), or about one percent of the Rhodesian population, participated in the referendum.

Under the Constitution whites are allotted 50 seats of the 66 member parliament. Of the 16 seats allotted to blacks, 8 are elected by the Council of Chiefs who, being appointed by the Government, generally support the Government line. The Constitution also provides the 250,000 whites with 44 million acres of land and the five million blacks with 45 million acres. The Land Tenure Act which is part of the Constitution bars interracial worship and interracial association for religious work. This law is being protested by the churches, but it is a strong indication that Rhodesia too is moving toward a policy of apartheid.

Prior to UDI about twenty countries maintained some form of consular establishments in Southern Rhodesia — including the U.S.

With the exception of Portugal and South Africa, these have now all been closed.

On March 17, 1970, the U.S. cast its first veto in the Security Council on the issue of condemning Great Britain for not using force in Southern Rhodesia. Actually it was a redundant veto as Great Britain's own veto was sufficient to kill the measure. The U.S. opposed the draft on two major counts: the condemnation of Great Britain for not using force and the call to cut off all communications between Rhodesia and the rest of the world. Accordingly U.S. Ambassador Yost said: "Such action ... was not in the interests of the oppressed majority and would have no decisive effect on the illegal minority regime."

UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia do not appear to have been successful in changing that Government's policies. A major reason for their lack of success, as referred to earlier in the South African section of this report, is the fact that sanctions are not being universally applied. South Africa and Mozambique, two of Rhodesia's neighbors, are assisting her by transshipping and in some cases reexporting embargoed goods. Other neighboring African states are unable, for reasons of their heavy economic dependence on Rhodesia, to cut off completely all trade with her, despite strenuous attempts in some instances to do so.

The U.S. continues to support sanctions against Rhodesia. In April 1970 a New York concern was indicted on charges of conspiracy to violate U.S. Government regulations imposing sanctions against Rhodesia. However, a comparatively small fine was imposed in relation to the probable profit gained in the transaction. The Panel is concerned that, as of the time of this writing, the U.S. Senate has adopted the Military Procurement Bill which includes a provision effectively permitting the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia. This would be in direct violation of the UN sanctions program and would raise serious questions concerning the U.S. commitment to the UN. The amendment was adopted, under intense lobbying from companies with chrome interests in Rhodesia, at a time when the U.S. Government has a reported stockpile of two and one quarter million tons of chrome

in excess of "foreseeable strategic needs" and when it has submitted legislation to sell 1.3 million tons from the stockpile as surplus. The Senate and House versions of the bill must now be worked out in committee before the final vote is taken. It appears, however, that the bill, as amended, will be adopted. The Panel recommends continued strong U.S. enforcement of the UN's sanctions program against the present Government of Southern Rhodesia and more stringent prosecution of those who violate the ban. We further recommend that the amendment to the Military Procurement Bill which would permit the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia, be defeated or, if enacted by the time this report is published, be repealed.

Internationally, some Western and Communist nations alike continue to violate sanctions and in some cases even increase their trade with Southern Rhodesia. It is interesting to note, for example, that some countries' chrome orders from South Africa are now about the same as their pre-sanction orders from Rhodesia. Greater effort needs to be exerted to identify and publicize violations. In this respect, the Panel welcomes the work of the sanctions committee of the Security Council and recommends that greater national and international publicity be given to violations. We recommend that the U.S. give strong support to the work of the sanctions committee. The U.S. has upheld the sanctions program and should not be timid in its efforts to persuade others to do the same.

As was suggested earlier in this report, the Panel's major concern is with those measures which would be most effective in helping achieve independence and representative government in southern Africa. In a sense, Southern Rhodesia has achieved independence but not representative government. Independence is the internationally recognized goal in Southern Rhodesia, but it cannot be accepted under conditions in which 95 percent of the population has no meaningful political rights.

During the summer and early fall of 1971, discussions between the Heath and Smith Governments are reported to have taken place. Many believe that this could lead to a granting of independence with only token guarantees that the agreements, especially those relating

to eventual majority rule, will be honored by the Smith or successor regime.

D. Angola and Mozambique

When Portugal became a member of the United Nations in 1955, she was asked to submit information on her non-self-governing territories. Portugal however maintained that the territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau (in northwestern Africa) were not non-self-governing but "overseas provinces" and integral parts of the Portuguese nation.

The territories are, in effect, colonies governed from Lisbon. Racial discrimination is not governmental policy, but the vast majority of blacks in these areas enjoy few political rights. Even whites in these territories have begun to complain about the Capital's role and their own lack of political power. Portugal's Premier Caetano announced, in December 1970, constitutional reforms which will give the territories greater local administrative autonomy and under which they are to become "autonomous regions within the Portuguese unitary state." These changes, however, will not significantly increase black participation in the Government.

The UN has through the years sought means by which negotiations could take place with insurgent nationalist groups "with a view to the transfer of power" leading to immediate independence. The General Assembly has urged members to break off diplomatic relations with Portugal, to close ports and refuse landing facilities to Portuguese carriers, and to boycott all trade with Portugal. More recently, the UN has focussed its attention on the military allies of Portugal within the framework of NATO to prevent the sale of arms and military equipment to Portugal. As previously mentioned, the 1970 General Assembly again condemned the collaboration among Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, and appealed to all states, particularly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to withhold from Portugal any assistance which enables it to

prosecute its colonial wars.

The Conference of Non-Aligned countries meeting in Lusaka in September 1970 called upon Portugal's NATO allies:

- "(a) to desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of African peoples in the Territories under its domination;
- (b) to take all necessary measures to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese Government; and
- (c) to stop the sale or shipment to the Portuguese Government of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition."

At the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in June 1971, a resolution was adopted condemning:

"... those Members of the Atlantic Alliance, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany and France, for refusing to cooperate with the United Nations efforts toward decolonization and for their assistance to the Portuguese regime in its criminal wars of repression and recolonization against the African peoples ..."

The second focus of international attention in dealing with the situation in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau is increased support for the liberation movements.

Nowhere else in southern Africa are the liberation movements as strong as they are in these three territories. In fact, it is estimated that Portugal now has military forces of about 55,000 in Angola, 40-60,000 in Mozambique, and 30,000 in Guinea Bissau to deal with the freedom fighters. Portugal is spending over half its total annual budget for the defense of these territories. This is a major drain of resources for a country with meager national assets and a per capita income of only \$300 per year.

The liberation movement is strongest in Guinea Bissau and is under particularly effective leadership. Many observers feel that Portugal can not long endure there. It is likely, however, that Portugal

will make acceptable political concessions only when facing complete defeat. Portugal fears a domino theory effect of the fall of Guinea on Angola and Mozambique. This is, in fact, a popular theory among the liberation movements, and there are indications that the Guinea Bissau movement has been given priority in terms of support and receipt of funds from other African Governments.

In Mozambique, liberation movements hold major portions of territory in the northern regions of Niassa and Cabo Delgado — perhaps one fifth the entire territory of Mozambique. However, the Government, in concert with South Africa, is building a giant hydroelectric scheme at Cabora Bassa in the Tete region and is making a major effort to keep the area clear of insurgent forces. Many believe the intent of the Portuguese in connection with Cabora Bassa is to move in as many white settlers as possible in order to help reestablish white control of the area. The figures mentioned range from 20-50,000 settlers according to the Portuguese Government to 500,000 according to the liberation movements. Whether or not this is in fact the intention of the Portuguese, the liberation movements also strongly oppose Cabora Bassa as furthering the economic alignment between South Africa and Portugal. They see it as an extension of South Africa's economic imperialism throughout southern Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia with the help of Tanzania and several other African states has led the fight to convince international companies and consortiums not to participate. So far Sweden, the U.S., and the Italian Government have withdrawn. West Germany and France remain.

U.S. policy toward the Portuguese Territories as expressed in the African Policy statement is that:

"... we shall continue to believe that their peoples should have the right of self-determination ... Believing that resort to force and violence is in no one's interest, we imposed an embargo in 1961 against the shipment of arms for use in the Portuguese territories. We have maintained this embargo and will continue to do so."

Church groups within the U.S. have become particularly active with regard to U.S. corporate involvement in Angola and Mozam-

bique. A Southern Africa Task Force of the United Presbyterian Church sponsored a proxy fight at the April 1971 shareholders' meeting of Gulf Oil Corporation. Gulf Oil is the largest U.S. investor in these territories with over \$150 million invested in Cabinda (Angola) and several million more planned for an expansion program. The task force proposed four resolutions:

1. to establish a committee to examine Gulf involvement in Portuguese Africa;
2. to provide for disclosure of charitable gifts;
3. to enlarge the Board of Directors; and
4. to amend the Corporation Charter to exclude investment with colonial-ruled areas.

They succeeded in obtaining about 2 million of about 175 million votes. Those supporting the task force project included the American Friends Service Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, several church groups, and 27 Senators and Representatives.

Portugal and NATO

The U.S. has stated its support for the right of self-determination in Portugal's African Territories and yet continues to give military assistance to a Government which denies self-determination. From 1953-1961 U.S. military assistance to Portugal, through its Military Assistance Program, amounted to nearly \$280 million. Since 1961 the U.S. has embargoed the shipment of arms for use in the Portuguese Territories. Consequently the program has been reduced and in 1970 amounted to \$1.3 million in terms of military assistance actually delivered. Whether the stipulation against the use of U.S. supplied arms in Portuguese Africa is strictly adhered to (and the liberation movements claim it is not), it is clear that the supply of these arms, equipment, and training to Portugal frees additional resources and equipment which can be used in her wars against her African colonies. As Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania said before the 25th session of the General Assembly:

"Does anyone imagine that one of the poorest States of Eu-

rope could, unaided, fight colonial wars in three Territories which are together twenty times its own size? On the contrary, its NATO membership allows it almost to disregard its domestic defence needs and devote its armies to Africa."

Portugal is an economically impoverished ally of the U.S. Her basic needs are economic not military. There was hope in the international community, when Dr. Marcello Caetano took over as Portugal's Prime Minister in September 1968, that there might be some significant change in Portuguese African policy. But this has not proven to be the case. She continues to spend upwards to 50 percent of her total annual budget in defense of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, in what appears to many as a distorted sense of national priorities.

We believe that independence and representative government will one day come to Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Any assistance, therefore, which helps Portugal perpetuate the "wars" which she is fighting in Africa cannot be in Portugal's own long-range policy interests — or in ours. It has been suggested that if the U.S. were to withdraw its military assistance to Portugal she might retaliate by demanding U.S. withdrawal from the Azores. This is a possibility — but one with which the U.S. could live. As was discussed earlier in this paper, U.S. military facilities in the Azores, while convenient, are not indispensable. Contingent arrangements could be developed if these proved necessary.

It is difficult to persuade those who are in the front lines in the battle for independence and majority rule in Portugal's African territories that U.S. military assistance to Portugal does not aid Portugal in her African "wars." U.S. support for self-determination in Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique and U.S. military support to Portugal are incompatible.

Is our military assistance program to Portugal so vital to U.S. national interests that we must jeopardize our relations with the great majority of nations on the vast African continent?

We do not believe parties to the NATO Treaty envisaged their role in any way as helping to subsidize or lend support to Portugal's wars of oppression in Africa. The U.S. Government maintains that its

military assistance program with Portugal is a bilateral agreement and is not related to our NATO Treaty obligation. The Panel recommends therefore that, until such time as Portugal can be persuaded to withdraw her troops from Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, all military assistance to Portugal be suspended and a complete arms embargo be imposed.

The cessation of U.S. military assistance to Portugal would mean we were no longer giving indirect support to Portugal in her wars against the people of Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, but it would, in a sense, only move us from an adversary to a neutral position in this struggle. We believe the U.S. can and should do more in the application of positive economic measures.

Rather than military assistance, Portugal's need is for economic development. By offering economic assistance the U.S. could encourage Portugal to accept independence as a legitimate goal in the African Territories. We could also apply diplomatic and political pressures in the course of our regular representations with the Portuguese Government.

The Panel recommends that the U.S. Government apply positive economic inducements to Portugal by offering her non-military assistance and that we exert whatever diplomatic and political influence we have on the Portuguese Government, in order to persuade Portugal to accept independence and majority rule in her African Territories.

Portugal's future lies not in Africa but in Europe. Integration with Europe may, in fact, be the only way in which Portugal will be able to extricate herself from Africa. Recent discussions concerning possible economic arrangements between Portugal and the European Economic Community (EEC) are a step in the right direction.

The Panel recommends that the U.S. Government encourage Portugal toward economic integration with Europe. Any U.S. loans, investment guarantees, etc. should be related to this goal. Aid which is not directed toward this end can only temporarily help alleviate Portugal's present economic plight and encourage her to continue her wars in Africa.

E. The Majority Ruled States in the Area

1. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland

These three states, former British protectorates, gained their independence since 1966.

Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa; Swaziland by South Africa and Mozambique; and Botswana by white minority governments except for a rather extraordinary and contested piece of geography — some 300 yards of common “border” with Zambia.

These states are developing and at the present time are highly dependent economically on South Africa; they are bound together with South Africa in a common customs union; their goods are transported across Rhodesia, Mozambique, as well as South Africa; and large numbers of their population work in South Africa’s mines, industries, and on her farms.

Of the three, Botswana is most likely to be able to develop a significant degree of independence from South Africa — for two reasons. First, rich mineral deposits have recently been discovered which may give her greater economic leverage; and second, Botswana does have direct access to Zambia, a black-majority-ruled state on her northern border. Although South Africa disputes that a common border actually exists, she is not openly opposing the development and expansion of a road and ferry between Zambia and Botswana across the Zambezi river. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is helping to fund this project which will provide Botswana with a doorway to the black-ruled states of Africa.

Botswana walks a tightrope between the necessity of limited cooperation with South Africa and an abhorrence of the system of apartheid. Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, in discussing his nation’s foreign policy has stated:

“... we are determined that no word or deed on Botswana’s part will give comfort to the advocates of race supremacy. We have unequivocally condemned the theory and practice of apartheid and in particular the extension of the full ap-

paratus of apartheid to the international trust territory of Namibia or South West Africa. Nevertheless we do not attempt to conceal that for obvious reasons Botswana must maintain diplomatic contacts with South Africa."

Attempts are being made by these three countries to establish greater independence from South Africa. They have joined together in the development of a University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland which has campuses or branches in each country. The U.S. is assisting the University, including its expansion, through AID. Until recently the only other university facilities available to black students in the area were in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

The Panel believes these countries should be encouraged in their efforts to establish greater freedom of action in their relations with South Africa. This is an area in which the U.S. Government can take positive action to aid in the struggle against apartheid.

U.S. assistance through AID to these three countries has increased substantially and in 1971 amounted to over \$10 million. This figure includes about \$2 million in technical assistance and a \$7 million loan to Botswana to help finance part of the infrastructure for a new mining industry. We are also making a loan of about \$2.2 million to Swaziland for agricultural development. The U.S. has already achieved some success in its efforts to encourage U.S. private investment in these countries. American Metal Climax is the principal shareholder in a mining venture in Botswana; the Libby Company operates a fruit canning plant in Swaziland; and the Newmont Mining Company is prospecting diamonds in Lesotho.

We commend our Government's policies of increased aid, technical assistance, and encouragement of U.S. private investment in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland and recommend they be vigorously pursued and augmented.

The Panel welcomes the recent appointment of a U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, who will be based in Botswana, but will travel frequently to the other capitals. This level of representation should help establish our interest in and concern for these countries and for their development as viable, independent

black-ruled states in the midst of the "white redoubt."

2. Zambia

South Africa regards Zambia as "odd man out" in southern Africa and a chief stumbling block to South Africa's policies. This is because Zambia has been able to develop a more independent foreign policy and can afford, therefore, to be more outspoken about South Africa's racial policies.

Zambia's traditional access routes to the sea for her copper have been through Rhodesia and Mozambique or Angola. This obviously placed her in a compromised position with these Governments. In order to extricate herself from this position, she sought new routes and in 1968 negotiated for the building of a railway link to the sea through Tanzania. Unable to obtain financing for this Tan-Zam Railroad from the U.S. or other Western nations, she accepted backing from the Mainland Chinese. Work began in late 1970 and is expected to be completed in 1975.

Zambia has made major attempts to adhere to the sanctions program against Rhodesia — and at greater cost than probably to any other UN member state. She does, however, of necessity retain some trade relations with Rhodesia, as she does with South Africa. The UN has called upon member states and other international organizations to assist Zambia in helping her overcome the economic difficulties which have arisen in connection with her attempt to maintain the Rhodesian sanctions. But these efforts have not been adequate.

Universal application of sanctions is vital to its success. Yet some states suffer disproportionately by adhering to it, at a time when others are increasing their trade with Rhodesia. The Panel recommends that greater consideration be given within the United Nations to the effects of the Rhodesian embargo and measures which might be taken to assist those who are suffering most from adhering to it.

3. Malawi

Malawi is the only black-ruled state in southern Africa which has diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Its economic dependence on South Africa — which includes the export of a substantial percentage of its work force to South Africa's mines — is considerable. This dependence is greater than that of Zambia which, at least, has significant copper resources. Malawi's economic options therefore are extremely limited and it views good relations with South Africa as a necessity. Moreover, because it is a landlocked country, Malawi is dependent on ports in Mozambique and thus to a certain extent on cordial relations with Portugal.

President Kamuzu Banda favors attempting to influence South Africa through contact, and until the June 1971 OAU meeting stood nearly alone among African states in public support of a "dialogue" with South Africa. In August 1971 President Banda made the first state visit of any black African leader to South Africa.

U.S. assistance to Malawi has totalled about \$18 million since independence in 1964. However, U.S. economic assistance reached its nadir in 1971, amounting to about \$700,000.

Malawi has one of Africa's lowest yearly per capita incomes — about \$40. The Panel recommends that the present small U.S. aid program in Malawi be strengthened in order to assist Malawi in her own economic development.

Refugees

Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania at present carry a large share of the burden for sheltering thousands of political refugees from southern Africa whose needs are great in terms of housing, education, and health care. The Panel recommends that the U.S. assist these Governments in their programs for the refugees.

F. Recommendations Relating to the Entire Area

1. African Nationalist Movements

For years African nationalist political leaders in white-ruled countries of southern Africa have suffered official restrictions on movement and political expression, police harassments, shortage of

operating funds, and other severe handicaps. One after another, their parties and movements have been banned. Some, nevertheless, have developed authentic organizations and programs and won large-scale followings.

In the Portuguese Territories African organizations are engaged in a limited insurgency, in limited areas. But in Rhodesia and South West Africa (where there are occasional guerilla raids) and South Africa, nationalist organizations are suppressed and have been forced underground.

Some of the leaders of these organizations, now refugees, have set up parties-in-exile, their main offices usually in Tanzania or Zambia, and other refugees have aligned themselves with these various parties. The leaders have secured education and training for many of the refugees through the UN or the programs of sponsoring countries, including the U.S., and private organizations. And some hundreds of the refugees have gone on to other African countries or to the Communist states for political and guerilla warfare training.

Thus the exile party centers have evolved into "liberation movements," although by no means all of their refugee-recruits are active in paramilitary or party work. "Freedom fighters" (to the white regimes, "terrorists") are sent forth from bases in Tanzania, Zambia, and (less so) the Congo for guerilla operations and political indoctrination of inhabitants of their homelands. Yet only in Angola and Mozambique have their operations been on a scale sufficient to present a serious threat to white control.

A great weakness of the liberation movements is the lack of effectively functioning organizations **within** the home areas, to which they could link up for the conduct of political opposition and/or subversion and insurgency. Further weaknesses lie in factionalism within several movements and disputes among rival parties.

Many exile leaders, nevertheless, are able men who have made real sacrifices for their causes, and even a limited capability in the various movements can have significant consequences in the tense, fear-ridden circumstances of southern Africa. At least some of these leaders and surely others among the refugees have some prospect of

one day returning and establishing their influence as political leaders.

If violent confrontation is to be avoided in southern Africa, change and the realization of representative government must eventually come through a political process involving negotiations between the white governments and the African nationalist movements and their leaders — although not necessarily as they are presently constituted. Strengthening these movements could thus strengthen the chances for political dialogue. Certainly, contact should be maintained.*

We recommend therefore that the U.S. Government establish or maintain contact with the liberation movements and that both the U.S. Government and private organizations support the movements in the non-military aspects of their programs, including educational and medical assistance.**

When the World Council of Churches first announced its decision in 1970 to give non-military support to the liberation movements, this was regarded by some (including, of course, the white-ruled governments) as support of violence.

We believe, however, that support of violence comes with support of the present oppressive white regimes. For it is oppression — not the legitimate aspirations of man to achieve his basic human rights — which breeds violence.**

2. UN Trust Funds for Southern Africa

As mentioned earlier, there are two UN trust funds, providing assistance to the people of southern Africa by such means as education and relief for refugees. The U.S. supported the creation of these funds, but has done little since to support them financially. In 1968 the U.S. did contribute \$25,000 to the South Africa Trust Fund but has never contributed to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme. The U.S. has objected to the fact that these Funds receive small allocations from the regular UN budget and feels the

*For reservation by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

**For dissent by Hans Ries and Edwin Munger, see page 87.

entire financing of these funds should be through voluntary contributions. The Panel believes that these funds serve a useful and, indeed, a necessary function, and should be financially supported by the U.S., both through voluntary contributions and by withdrawal of the U.S. objection to allocations from the regular UN budget. The U.S. voted in favor of the creation of the new United Nations Trust Fund for Namibia, and should support it financially as soon as it becomes operative.

3. An Inter-departmental Task Force on Southern Africa

Too often governments tend not to give a potential or developing conflict situation the kind of policy attention it requires until it has reached crisis proportions — until many options and avenues to conflict resolution are closed and violence becomes a *fait accompli*.

We believe that the situation in southern Africa is still fluid and that opportunities to influence the situation are still available.

What is required, we believe, is a long-term commitment — not a brief spurt of attention. In terms of U.S. policy this means the establishment within the government of an on-going mechanism whose sole function would be to study U.S. involvement in southern Africa and continually reevaluate developments there with a view to evolving a cohesive U.S. policy toward the entire area. At present, U.S. relations with southern Africa operate on a multiplicity of levels and involve various departments of government. Such a mechanism would thus require participation of representatives from the key government departments concerned.

The Panel recommends that an Inter-departmental Task Force on Southern Africa be established which would include representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Treasury, and the White House to undertake an on-going and comprehensive analysis of U.S. involvement in, and relations with, southern Africa with a view toward recommending and coordinating U.S. policy.


Priority consideration should be given by the Task Force to the issue of the role of American business in southern Africa. Earlier in this report the Panel recommended that American businesses operat-

ing in South Africa adopt programs of fair and non-racially discriminatory labor practices with a view to improving the economic and social conditions of non-white workers and assisting the forces for change. (This should apply to American businesses operating in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique as well.) This program requires close and continued scrutiny both in terms of its implementation and in its effect. **We recommend that a continuing evaluation of both the initiation and implementation of these programs be undertaken by the Task Force, and that a report on their effectiveness be made in about two years. The inter-departmental unit should assist American companies in adopting these programs, including the establishment of guidelines.**

Other subjects which require the attention and study of the Task Force include three which have already been mentioned in this report: the legal possibility and political advisability of direct American investments in the Bantustans; the development of an international code for businessmen; and the denial of tax deductions and credits to those American companies that continue to do business in Namibia.

The Task Force should help to establish the importance of southern African issues both within the Government and with the American people and assist in providing to these issues the kind of immediate and long-range attention they require.

5. Epilogue



Southern Africa is a highly volatile part of the world where the potential for violence runs high and the possibility of a major conflict looms large. It is an area which presents major problems for U.S. policy both in international organizations and increasingly in relation to our own domestic concerns.

In examining U.S. policy toward southern Africa the Panel has been aware of the limitations of U.S. influence in the area — aware that in the struggle for independence and majority rule the U.S. can only be supportive. **We believe that the real forces for change in southern Africa must come from within southern Africa itself, from its own people, white and non-white alike.**

Ultimately, the whites of southern Africa must be willing to relinquish their total and absolute political power and share this power in some form with the non-whites. The real questions are how and when this will be accomplished and what outside measures or policies would be most effective in helping to bring this about.

This is not an easy determination.

There is honest disagreement over the means which would best effect change. We have concluded that there may be no one “right” approach which would apply across the board to the totality of U.S. interrelationships with southern Africa. We have, for example, supported both a boycott in sports and increased contact for South Africans with the rest of the world.

Our concern has been with those measures which we believe would be the most effective means for achieving self-determination and racial equality throughout southern Africa. We have not been

concerned with promoting or defending a particular approach. Different approaches, used by different groups, at different times, may be equally effective.

It is our hope that recommendations of the kind which we have suggested will at least minimize the chances for violence and maximize the opportunities for peaceful change.

Memoranda of Comment, Reservation and Dissent

COMMENT AND RESERVATION BY WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.

Comment (page 40)

To say this, however, is not to say that South Africa should not be made aware that her present actions if not changed will create a threat to the peace and at some point the international community, including the permanent members of the Security Council, might unanimously sanction the use of force jointly.

Reservation (page 46)

The necessary inference of this recommendation is that the Panel is not at this time recommending that American companies immediately withdraw all existing investments from South Africa. I could accede to this recommendation only if a reasonable time limitation was inserted in which the American companies would start and complete the process of conducting their business in South Africa in such a manner that there was no discrimination with respect to employment, wages, services, etc., and provided this report also would recommend withdrawal of the investment of American companies, in any event, if South Africa did not eliminate its present racial practices and the denial of the vote and other participation in government to blacks within a reasonable time, 3-5 years, for example.

COMMENTS AND RESERVATION BY RUTH S. MORGENTHAU AND WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.

We believe the United States government is partly responsible by omission as well as commission for the conditions of increasing

repression in South Africa of the African nationalist movements, and has some responsibility for the difficulties in which the African nationalists find themselves. Moreover, if conditions do not change substantially in United States relations to the apartheid rulers of South Africa, the U.S. will be further and further implicated in their immoral and inhuman policies. The U.S. government should not only encourage and help strengthen the liberation movements, it should also develop a policy toward southern Africa to counterbalance the growing tendency of the South African government to establish hegemony outside its borders. The U.S., to keep the South African government from becoming stronger, should help those who stand up against it, outside as well as inside South African borders.

Comment (page 40)

Historically, the South African government has made it a practice to equate Communism with the fight for ordinary human freedoms. Under its Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, as amended, Communism is defined in extremely loose terms, to include advocating anything "calculated to further the achievement of any of the objectives of Communism." Many of those objectives are identical with the objectives of democracy. The South African government would label any revolt as a Communist conspiracy, and under its laws there would be no problem in manufacturing the evidence. The United States should not aid the South African government to suppress internal revolt, directly or indirectly, regardless of claims that there was outside support for such a revolt by countries we generally would oppose. The United States government must make clear that there is ample reason to revolt in South Africa, and that we sympathize with those reasons. Under no circumstances should we allow ourselves to be dragged into hostilities on the side of the South African government.

Reservation (page 55)

More contact is fine provided all the terms are not set by the South African government. There has been a stream of visiting government supporters sent by the South African government to the United States. They travel freely here. Yet the South African government

puts stiff restrictions on the travel by Americans in South Africa, and takes reprisals against its citizens who speak the truth to visiting foreigners. The deep and pernicious official security net-work in South Africa, involving both black and white, has produced conditions in which organizing opposition against the South African government is terribly difficult. The creation of new overseas contacts for South Africans should not provide further opportunities for the South African government to reenforce the security apparatus. Exchange and travel abroad should not be so organized as to allow the South African government to reward its supporters at home, or to provide free junkets to opinion makers from abroad, avowedly sympathetic to them. Too few, if any, opportunities to travel at home or abroad exist for opponents of the South African government. For these reasons, dialogue and further exchange should only take place if the ground rules are carefully set to allow critics of the government access abroad.

RESERVATION AND COMMENT BY RUTH S. MORGENTHAU

Reservation (page 48)

Conditions for Africans in South Africa have become worse, not better, over the last twenty years, in spite of phenomenal economic growth. I am skeptical about the will or ability of United States businesses to police themselves on whether their products contribute to apartheid. The United States government should screen the products and indicate which items actively contribute to maintaining apartheid, as the government is already doing on arms. I am also skeptical about the ability or willingness of United States owned businesses to adopt fair labor practices, in the absence of adequate enforcement machinery. Our government should require U.S. businesses to provide regular information about present labor practices and future plans, and penalize as well as publicize those who do not comply. If these interim measures do not lead to a change in employment practices, the U.S. government should require U.S. business to withdraw entirely from South Africa.

Comment (page 51)

The United States government should actively discourage trade with South Africa. Trade, historically, has led to further investment. When the market reaches a certain level of magnitude through trade, economic considerations usually impel a company to start local production. To halt this dynamic, which helped produce the striking rise in U.S. investments in South Africa over the past two decades, we need to do more than simply say "no new investments." We must also prevent the conditions which lead to the new investments, by actively discouraging trade with South Africa.

COMMENTS, RESERVATIONS, AND DISSENTS BY HANS A. RIES AND EDWIN S. MUNGER

The report seems to be too emotional on the negative side without taking into consideration recent changes within Southern Africa and the new approach of an increasing number of African States toward the Republic of South Africa. Stressing the negative side, without taking into consideration some recent positive developments is driving the white minority in the Republic of South Africa again into a psychological fear complex, well known as the "laager" complex.

We would prefer to follow an old definition of diplomacy as the art of the possible.

Comment (page 31)

We do not believe that one can define the reason for possible violence in Africa, and assign responsibility to one or the other groups, since this would be pre-judging a theoretical happening.

Comment (page 34)

We believe that with the establishment of Bantustans, the South African Government has at least started a trend which, if logically followed through, could be the beginning of a solution. We therefore believe that it is essential to induce the South African Government and public opinion to increase the area of the Bantustans, for instance, to exclude all white enclaves such as port cities, etc.; to increase the administrative and policy-making powers of such leaders as Chief

Buthelezi; in short, to make the Bantustans politically and economically viable, and to permit contact between their leaders and leaders of black Africa.

Dissent (page 44)

We cannot agree with the recommendation since it is unenforceable according to our present laws and therefore simply a rhetorical statement, but we would strongly support the suggestion that American companies invest directly in the Bantustans. Such investments would certainly assist in making these territories economically viable.

Dissent (page 48)

We disagree with this recommendation because it is simply impractical and unenforceable.

Dissent (page 50)

We disagree with the Panel's recommendation as impractical and unenforceable.

Reservation (page 53)

A re-evaluation of the South African sugar quota would affect black labor and we therefore would prefer to recommend that any benefits derived from the sugar quota by South Africa should be paid in full for development of Zululand. The Zulus are the labor in the sugar industries and a large part of the sugar production is actually derived from Zulu territories. The Zulus would therefore be the beneficiaries of such profits.

Reservation (page 78)

We agree that contact with the liberation movements should be maintained, but we feel that as long as the U.S. Government maintains diplomatic relations with the Southern African countries, any support for educational or medical assistance should be the prerogative of private organizations and private individuals only.

Dissent (page 78)

We consider this statement unnecessary and cannot subscribe to it.

DISSENT BY EDWIN S. MUNGER

Certainly the United States should in no way encourage or support the present system of racial discrimination in South Africa. The U.S. should have long ago attempted to assign black Americans to official posts throughout all of southern Africa. In South Africa I have been able to entertain friends of all races in rented homes and in major hotels. This hospitality has been warmly reciprocated by Africans and Afrikaners alike. Inter-racial and international sporting events are taking place within South Africa. But the tremendous strides made in integrating international sports are not recognized by this Report. And rather than boycotting these events, they should be encouraged. Neither does the Report reflect the growing internal dialogue as evidenced by Prime Minister Vorster's visits to the Homelands, his discussion with black Lutheran Bishops in South West Africa, and the great success of the US-SA non-racial symposium in Johannesburg.

Yes, the United States should encourage the integration of Portugal into the European community. Yes, the United States should increase its aid to the independent black countries of southern Africa, particularly to Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, which, to Britain's disgrace, were long known as her neglected African slums. I concur in the support for Malawi and helping Zambia achieve the high ideals it has set for itself.

Of course, the Coloured community and the Asians must find their political representation in the "white" parliament. Present plans for the political representation of urban Africans are unsatisfactory. Equal pay for equal work is essential for all. What the Report fails to acknowledge is that these points are frequently made by leading white South Africans of all parties in parliament, by both European language groups, and in the English, Afrikaans, and African press.

The Polaroid experiment is a noble one. But it is an American disgrace that on balance American firms in South Africa pay less to their African employees than do South African firms, although there is no law barring raises in wages. Opportunities for promotion to higher skilled jobs for Africans are by no means fully utilized by American

firms.

The Report does not adequately reflect the views of men like Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer of the Zululand Territorial Authority, who are well educated, non-racialistic, and impatient of the slow pace of change. Buthelezi's charismatic appeal from the subsistence farmer to the African professor is important because he understands the complexities of the South African scene and of the promise it gives for achieving a peaceful sharing of political power with the acquiescence of the dominant Afrikaner establishment. As Buthelezi has so wisely pointed out to the Afrikaners, they achieved political rights not by defeating British colonialism but through peaceful efforts. I believe along with African leaders such as Buthelezi, Prime Minister Matanzima, and Chief Mangope that the African people have just started on that same road. I believe that the students who cheered President Kamuzu Banda and Gatsha Buthelezi when they spoke at Stellenbosch University will join the growing ranks of *verligte* or enlightened Afrikaners who are now working for change to a just society with, to quote two prominent Afrikaners, "No discrimination based upon race."

The Panel is right in recommending that the U.S. Government make it clear to South Africa that it will not assist in suppressing internal revolt. The responsibility rests upon South Africa to create conditions of social, economic, and political progress which would remove causes for revolt. It is also true, as the Report recognizes, that consistency in approaching South Africa is not necessarily a virtue. But with rare exceptions, cultural isolation and economic boycotts are counter productive. I oppose limitations of American trade with China, Cuba, or South Africa, not because I approve of their political systems, but because isolationism, whether domestic or foreign, is rarely effective and bars other avenues for influencing change.

The United States Government would be following a precedent of real danger in application elsewhere if it accepts the Panel thesis that violence on the part of liberation groups is the fault of the minority governments because they, by themselves, are a violent act. I am persuaded to a contrary view — namely, that of U.S. Assistant

Secretary of State, David Newsom, when he argues, "Specifically, much as we deplore apartheid in South Africa and other forms of racial discrimination, or the denial of majority rule, we cannot agree that they automatically constitute a 'threat to peace,' in the sense of Chapter VII, Article 39, of the Charter ..." In the same context Mr. Newsom says, "We regard that chapter of the Charter as a most precious thing. It might someday make the difference between world peace and holocaust."

Regrettably, the Report shares a weakness of the United Nations itself: that of trying to do or recommending the doing of more than can be accomplished (including most worthy goals) and consequently weakening its credibility. This has also become an American habit to which I cannot subscribe, either in Asia or in Africa.

RESERVATION BY HANS A. RIES (page 40)

I would be willing to subscribe to this recommendation if it read simply: "The Panel recommends that the U.S. Government make clear to the present Government of South Africa that the U.S. would not go to its defense or give aid in the suppression of internal revolt."

COMMENT BY WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN (page 56)

Personally, I would strongly favor increased "dialogue" with South Africa if it meant open two-way communication between ourselves and the various elements of South African society. But this is hardly what South Africa intends by its new "outward-looking" policy. The President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, has stated the actual situation in these words, "Western observers and some Africans have also claimed that the outward-looking policy will, by ending South Africa's isolation, bring changes within its borders. But we must be clear about the motives behind South Africa's strategies. The outward-looking policy is for export only — it has nothing to do with internal liberalization. The condition for dialogue with South Africa is acceptance of the status quo. Its rulers have made it quite clear that the dialogue with black Africa can be about many things, but it cannot, at this stage, be about political change or self-determination."

We must keep these realities carefully in mind as we work to break down South Africa's isolation.

COMMENT BY BRAD LEE SKINNER (page 48)

Over the past twenty years all of us can clearly see the entrenchment of regimes dedicated to white economic and social supremacy. The entrenchment has been nourished by abusive use of police power and repressive legislation.

In southern Africa every fundamental human right relating to speech, association, movement, property, employment, marriage has been abridged and restricted by law imposed upon a majority for the interests of a small minority. This is history, it cannot be disputed. The trends are clear.

In the Republic of South Africa since the Nationalists came to power non-white representation has been excluded from an all white Parliament, multi-racial parties banned, black opposition leaders exiled or banned, and the Terrorism Act imposed which permits the indefinite detention of "terrorists." Under the enforcement of the Pass Law, which controls work, home life, and mobility, some 600,000 individuals are arrested annually for violations (usually for not having their pass on their person). Since the 1950's the black-white wage gap has widened not decreased. With this as history up to the present time, with the reality of legislation and enforcement of oppressive law, I cannot really believe that the Panel conceives change to be possible within the present system.

For instance, the "Polaroid Experiment" which the Panel applauds as a possible course of social change is impossible to carry out to any meaningful degree under enforcement of the present law. Under South African legislation black and white workers cannot be treated equally. Scholarships given to blacks could only be used in non-white universities. These are the facts. After 20 years of nurturing apartheid neither the National nor United Party is going to reverse this trend. Certainly under the law some changes in factory conditions can be made, but these changes will only be minute. They will not bring about a condition close to "equal opportunity."

Regarding the Portuguese territories, the Report talks of Gulf Oil Corporation as a major factor in Portuguese stability in Angola. The Report fails however to make recommendations besides eluding to proxy campaigns. It makes no mention of a national Gulf Boycott which has begun throughout this country.

South Africa has increased its alliances economically, militarily, and politically with Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories. It has solidified Namibia as part and parcel of its rule. Its influence over Rhodesia has led Rhodesia to impose the Land Tenure Act.

I fear that given the trends of history, the blind enforcement of oppressive legislation, and the continuance of resistance to all forms of meaningful social change, we will see change come only through revolutionary means.

As the Panel stated: "it is oppression — not the legitimate aspirations of man to achieve his basic human rights — which breeds violence." Oppression is breeding that violence. The liberation movements in that part of the world will grow, not to serve as a catalyst for dialogue but to bring about change through revolution.

DISSENT BY CLIFFORD L. ALEXANDER, JR.

I dissent from those recommendations which acquiesce in the continuation of American corporate interests in South Africa. I find that conclusion inconsistent with the prior recommendation that no new American investments should go into South Africa since the same conditions would exist in both instances. Rather, I believe the Administration should submit appropriate legislation to Congress for the removal of all U.S. economic interests as soon as possible. We should put the principle of human dignity above the inanimate object of corporate profits. In my judgement this report fails to do this.

I feel, in addition, that the local discriminatory employment practices of our Government within South Africa, as well as its refusal to include black Americans in significant positions in the Consulates and within the Embassy, are hypocritical extensions of a policy that accepts racism abroad and preaches brotherhood at home.

Finally, I would consider it useful as well for our Government

to give careful and immediate attention to the possibility of severing diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa. It is superfluous to say that we should not interfere with the internal affairs of others. Our history is exactly the opposite. Through the diplomatic and economic leverage available it is entirely possible that our nation might indeed hasten some constructive change within South Africa.

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
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Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans



In an attempt to gauge reaction to this report and its recommendations, UNA-USA provides the following questionnaire. We would appreciate your response.

- 1) Do you agree that southern Africa represents a potential conflict situation which could involve the U.S.?

- 2) Do you believe the recommendations of the report, if followed, could lessen the potential for violence?

- 3) How important do you consider U.S. economic and political interests to be in all Africa as compared with those in the white-dominated areas of southern Africa?

- 4) What is the appropriate role for American businesses operating in South Africa?

- 5) Is the conduct of American business abroad a legitimate concern of the U.S. Government?

- 6) What is your reaction to the recommendation that the U.S. cease all military assistance to Portugal?

- 7) Do you believe economic sanctions, such as those the UN has applied against Southern Rhodesia, can be an effective means of bringing about change in another government's policies?

- 8) What do you consider to be the most important recommendation of this Panel?

- 9) Are there other approaches, not outlined in the report, which you believe are of particular importance for U.S. policy toward southern Africa?

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